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AN ARENA-BASED SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY 
PLANNING FOR STAGE I OF THE 





The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) was established as an 
Emergency Preparedness Program on January 30, 1997 following the passage of the 
Maritime Security Act of 1996 that led to the subsequent establishment of the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP).  VISA is complemented by MSP; which provides the 
Department of Defense (DOD) with assured access to 47 militarily useful U.S.-flag 
commercial vessels as a condition for receiving government incentives that include 
preference to peacetime shipping contracts and a $2.1 million subsidy per ship/year to 
help defray the cost of U.S. registry. Specifically, VISA augments the organic sealift 
capability of DOD during a contingency or national emergency by providing assured 
access to time-phased U.S.-flag commercial sealift capacity, mariners, global 
infrastructure and intermodal facilities.  The objective of this thesis-project is to apply 
various shipping data relevant to VISA Stage I in an Arena-based simulation model.  
Specifically, the model will explore capacity-planning events as they may occur during a 
two major theater war scenario, as well as examine elements of variability and risk that 
may be inherent to VISA Stage I events. 
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Sealift is a key component of the United States (U.S.) Defense Transportation 
System and is also a supporting pillar of the United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) strategic mobility triad (sealift, airlift and prepositioning).  This 
networked alignment of transportation assets enables the Department of Defense (DOD) 
to support the execution of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy 
of the United States.  To this end, a robust maritime capability consisting of U.S. citizen 
mariners and militarily useful U.S.-flag commercial vessels that can augment DOD 
organic sealift capability during peacetime and war remains a vitally important 
requirement.  In an October 8, 2002 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee 
Merchant Marine Panel, USTRANSCOM’s General John W. Handy stated the following: 
Only 33 percent of the vessels we may require reside in our organic fleets.  
The remainder of the sealift capacity needed to transport military 
equipment and supplies comes from the commercial sector. (Ref. 1) 
To this end, the U.S. Maritime Administration conceived and formulated the basic 
tenets and concepts for establishment of the VISA program.  Patterned after the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet – an airlift mobilization program that was implemented in 1951; VISA 
was approved on January 30, 1997 by the Secretary of Defense as a cooperative initiative 
among DOD, the Department of Transportation – Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
and the U.S.-flag commercial carrier industry.  Sponsorship of VISA is delegated to the 
Administrator of MARAD under the authority of the Secretary of the Department of 
Transportation (DOT).  However, operational control of shipping capacity reverts to 
USTRANSCOM’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) during any VISA stage activation. 
VISA encompasses over 75 percent of available dry-cargo capacity in the U.S.-
flag commercial fleet. (Ref. 2)  Seventy percent of this capacity is derived from 47 ships 
that comprise the Maritime Security Program.  In 2003, the combined capacity metric for 
VISA/MSP was 174,500 twenty-foot container equivalents (TEUs), which exceeded the 
DOD requirement for 165,000 TEUs. (Ref. 3) This underscores the scope of VISA as 
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well as the level of capacity augmentation that would convey to DOD during any phase 
activation.  However, VISA is only activated after U.S. government-owned vessels and 
available foreign flag shipping capacity are totally exhausted.  Upon VISA Stage I 
activation, non-MSP U.S.-flag commercial operators can volunteer up to 15 percent of 
their capacity.  In Stage II, non-MSP vessel capacity can volunteer as much as 40 percent 
of available capacity.  However, in Stage III, carriers must volunteer a minimum of 50 
percent of their non-MSP vessel capacity.  The Commander USTRANSCOM can 
activate any of the VISA stages with the approval of the SECDEF. 
U.S. military sealift capability is generally derived from organic (government-
owned or controlled) or commercial – privately owned ship capacity.  This recalls a key 
aspect or tenet of VISA is to leverage the capabilities of the U.S.-flag commercial fleet, 
thereby augmenting the sealift capabilities provided in military vessels. (Ref. 4)  
In other words, VISA augments DOD’s organic shipping assets contained in the 
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) by guaranteeing 
access to the capacity of commercial carriers and is therefore an improvement over the 
SRP and requisitioning programs.  Details about the NDRF and RRF are covered in 
Chapter II.  
VISA also exists in a joint planning environment that facilitates the exchange of 
information.  Simply stated, a VISA Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG) consisting of 
representatives from USTRANSCOM, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Combatant Commanders, MARAD and appropriate carriers convene periodically to plan 
and determine “how best to use VISA carriers’ sealift capacity to meet DOD contingency 
requirements.” (Ref.5)  This high-level planning and coordination fosters cooperation 
among agency representatives and provides transparency to the DOD sealift planning 
process with the commercial carrier industry.  As a result, military logistics planners are 
more aware of the capacity they can expect from the commercial industry during a 
contingency as well as peacetime.  Likewise, carriers obtain a better idea of DOD’s 
sealift needs.  The planning process is summarized and illustrated in Figure 1 below. 






Figure 1.   Determining VISA Stages I, II and III (From Ref. 7) 
 
Other benefits of the VISA planning process include carrier coordination 
agreements (CCAs) that provide carriers with the flexibility to coordinate shipping efforts 
without violating anti-trust laws; and a pre-determined compensation or rate system that 
streamlines the transition to a contingency or war footing in the event of VISA activation.  
The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the key steps, coordination and feedback involved in 




Figure 2.   VISA Activation Process (From Ref. 9) 
 
B. ALTERNATE SEALIFT PROGRAMS 
1. Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) 
Prior to the approval and implementation of VISA, two other sealift mobilization 
programs or modalities for accessing commercial shipping capacity during national 
emergencies or contingencies existed: (1) The Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) and (2) 
Requisitioning.  SRP can be traced back to the establishment of the Commercial Sealift 
Augmentation Program in 1969.  However, a subsequent re-identification of the program 
in 1971 led to the current SRP designation.  Even though SRP pre-dates VISA by nearly 
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three decades, it has never been activated during a contingency.  The closest the program 
came to activation was the Persian Gulf War – Desert Shield/Desert Storm.  However, 
general concern for the impact activation would have on competition in the commercial 
carrier industry and the availability of alternate commercial shipping capacity caused 
USTRANSCOM to forego its use.  SRP remains in existence today as an alternate sealift 
mobility program and can be applied to carriers not enrolled in VISA. 
2. Requisitioning 
Requisitioning is an alternative to VISA and SRP that allows the U.S. government 
– the Department of Transportation MARAD to invoke Section 902 of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 to gain access (charter or purchase) to the capacity of vessels that 
may be fully or partially-owned by U.S. citizens but under foreign registry.  In this 
regard, U.S.-owned or majority owned vessels under foreign registry are subject to the 
“Effective U.S. Control” (EUSC) rule that allows MARAD to submit a requisition for use 
when sealift requirements exceed that of VISA and SRP.  However, this is permissible 
only if shipping capacity in all stages of VISA and SRP are exhausted.  In other words, 
requisitioning is a program of last resort. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The key questions raised by this research project are as follows: (1) What is the 
material that is possible to be transported during Stage 1 of VISA activation using the 
normal commercial trade routes and schedules?  (2) In terms of material transported, 
what is the marginal benefit of adding one more ship to the existing the commercial trade 
route and similarly what is the marginal cost of losing one ship from the trade route?  (3) 
What is the amount of material that can be transported given a specific vessel capacity 
and assuming a “risk contingent” case scenario?  (4) What are the risks involved after 
activation of the VISA/MSP program? (5) How will these risks impact the DOD sealift 
capability i.e. the time it takes to deliver the materiel?  Note that “actual” military 
material to be transported for a two-major theater war (2MTW) scenario was not 
simulated, as specific data from prior and current Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-
Up Review documents remain classified. 
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D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
The objective of this thesis-project is to conduct an Arena-based model simulation 
analysis that examines the projected employment and utilization of U.S.-flag commercial 
shipping capacity in Stage I of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) 
program.  
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The research objective of this project is to explore the Voluntary Intermodal 
Sealift Agreement (VISA) program in conjunction with an Arena-based simulation 
analysis that examines the utilization of U.S.-flag commercial shipping capacity in VISA 
Stage I.  Specifically, this project will explore sealift capability by modeling commercial 
vessel transit time, schedules, routes and capacity.  Military planners base sealift 
requirements on estimates established in current Mobility Requirements Study 
documents.  Specifically, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 1995 Mobility Requirements 
Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU) estimated that the U.S. might face a foe 
or foes in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts somewhere on the Korean Peninsula 
or in the Persian Gulf.  The most current (2005) Mobility Requirements Study (MRS 05) 
supported the findings of the earlier studies.  However, these documents remain 
classified, so the specifics on actual vessel capacity (vessel volume or square footage) 
required to move the combat support materiel of U.S. forces during the sustainment phase 
of VISA Stage 1 could not be examined in this unclassified report.  As a result, any 
references to MRS BURU are based on second-hand sources.  In other words, extensive 
use was made of information available in the public realm – Internet sources that 
provided commercial carrier routes, schedules, capacity and speed.   
In general, vessels in the VISA program are of the Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) 
variety, Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), combination RO/RO and container, breakbulk, 
seagoing tugs and barges. (Ref. 10)  However, the simulation modeling undertaken in this 
research project was limited to ships of the container, RO/RO and LASH convention.  
VISA has never been activated since its implementation in 1997.  For example, DOD 
achieved its sealift mobilization goals during the first Gulf War – Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom (OIF); using government organic shipping assets, contractual agreements and 
request for proposals (RFPs) to utilize U.S.-flag and foreign flag commercial vessels.  
Therefore, it is assumed that VISA might only be activated if requirements exceeded that 
of a Desert Shield/Desert Storm equivalent contingency, for example, if two nearly 
simultaneous contingencies on the scale of Desert Shield/Desert Storm were to occur.  
Despite the constraints outlined above, the simulation model is a useful tool that the user 
can apply to make predictions about materiel transportation via sealift.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II will establish the rationale for the establishment of VISA by exploring 
the role of sealift in strategic mobility.  A brief discussion of the Strategic Mobility Triad 
– airlift, prepositioning and sealift will be discussed to compare and contrast these 
transportation modalities and their relevance to VISA.  The remainder of the chapter will 
explore the decline of the maritime industry; the ongoing flag of convenience trend; the 
role of legislation in sealift revitalization.  Chapter III will focus on a brief overview of 
risk management and assessment, followed by an exploration of the impact of risk on the 
activities in VISA Stage I.  Chapter IV will establish the basis for the development of the 
Arena model simulation as well as serve as a guide for documenting and interpreting the 
output data.  Finally, Chapter V will develop conclusions, discuss limitations, and address 
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II. RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VISA 
A. THE ROLE OF SEALIFT IN STRATEGIC MOBILITY 
Strategic mobility, the capability to transport military forces rapidly across 
intercontinental distances into an operational theater, lies at the heart of 
US military strategy. (Ref. 11) 
      - JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILLI 
         Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 
Sealift is predicated on meeting DOD transportation requirements in three areas: 
pre-positioned materiel for ready response to warfighter needs; surge to achieve rapid 
power projection; sustainment for ongoing contingency operations. (Ref. 12)  To this end, 
ships carried 72 percent of the dry cargo during the Persian Gulf War – Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm; with an additional 13 percent dedicated to forward deployed 
prepositioned vessels.  Commercial carriers accounted for nearly half of the total 
shipping capacity during this period; much of it coming from foreign flag carriers.  It is 
estimated that 130,000 twenty-foot equivalents units (TEUs) and 825,000 square feet of 
roll-on/roll-off U.S.-flag commercial container capacity is required to meet the sealift 
transportation requirements stipulated for a two major theater war threat scenario.  
However, this capacity far exceeds that which is available in DOD’s organic sealift 
capability.  As a result, DOD has always looked to the U.S. commercial maritime 
industry to make up for any shortfall in sealift capability during a national emergency, 
war or contingency.  VISA helps maintain a viable U.S.-owned and U.S.-flag commercial 
fleet that is crewed by a pool of U.S. citizen-mariners who are subject to U.S. laws.  This 
requirement has been underscored in many transportation-oriented journals, as well as 
articles and speeches made by industry experts and US policy makers.  For example, in 
signing the Maritime Security Act of 1996, President Bill Clinton stated the following:   
The American Merchant Marine is an important component of the sealift 
needed by the DOD.  By contracting with the owners and operators of 
U.S. Flag commercial vessels, the Government will gain access to a fleet 
of modern commercial ships, along with the sophisticated intermodal 
transportation systems supporting it. (Ref. 13)   
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President George Bush echoed similar sentiments in a 1991 proclamation that 
linked the victory achieved during the First Gulf War (Desert Shield /Desert Storm) to 
“…the importance of the American merchant marine to maintaining an adequate and 
reliable sealift capacity for the United States.” (Ref. 14)  The significance of the 1996 
Maritime Security Act as an amendment to the Maritime Security Act of 1936 was that 
the 1996 Maritime Security Act established the basis for the creation of Maritime 
Security Program; the foundation or overarching document for the VISA program.  A 
primary goal of this amendment was to insure that, U.S.-flag commercial shipping and 
the mariners that crew the vessels remain a vital part of the nation’s maritime capability 
in peacetime, as well as in the event of a national emergency or contingency.   
An important driver behind the resurgence of sealift as a key marker of military 
capability was based on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War – Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, from August 1990 to March 1991.  “In the aftermath of that war, the 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that although the deployment was largely 
successful, those troops who were deployed earliest faced considerable risk…” (Ref. 15)  
The impact of “lessons learned” from the First Gulf War – Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
were also highlighted in a 1997 GAO study that suggested that the Army would need to 
deploy a full heavy division in two weeks in the event of a contingency in the Persian 
Gulf region. (Ref. 16)  The study also estimated that the plan would place significant 
strains on U.S. strategic mobility. (Ref. 17) 
As a follow-up to lessons from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, a 1993 Mobility 
Requirements Study-Bottom-Up Review (MRS-BURU) was conducted within the 
context of a thawing Cold War environment and as a result focused on the achievement 
of military objectives, while keeping cost in check.  Specifically, military experts applied 
computer simulations of combat and deployments to assess the level of risk US forces 
would face in a “Two-Major Regional Conflict or Theater War” scenario.  Having 
established the basis for developing capabilities to respond to two-near simultaneous 
regional conflicts, senior civilian and military leadership of DOD expanded the breadth 
of their study in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by including the Post-
Cold War period and the uncertain security environment posed of the Global War on 
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Terrorism threat.  As a result, the need for force transformation to combat the asymmetric 
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has taken center stage in 
defense policy.  Additionally, the planned withdrawal of troops from overseas forward 
theaters is forging a new reality that is predicated on deployment speed and force agility.  
To this end, the MRS BURU recommended that DOD attain a surge sealift capacity of 
ten million square feet. (Ref. 18)  The findings of the MRS BURU also drove the 
requirement for DOD to procure 19 Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off vessels that 
have since made a significant impact on Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OEF/OIF) sealift.  
B. MSP OVERVIEW AND RELEVANCE TO VISA 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the Maritime Security Act of 1996 
provided the basis for the establishment of the Maritime Security Program (MSP).  
Specifically, the Merchant Marine Act stated that it was necessary for the U.S. to retain a 
Merchant Marine as a naval auxiliary for national defense; for foreign commerce or 
international trade; for domestic and import trade; for maintaining a pool of trained U.S. 
citizen mariners that can crew U.S. flag ships during a contingency.  Ocean carriers 
enrolled in the MSP benefit by receiving subsidies ($2.1 million per year per ship) that 
help offset the cost of operating vessels under U.S. registry.  Carriers enrolled in MSP 
also benefit by receiving preferences for DOD peacetime-related shipping contracts.  In 
return for these incentives, carrier operators are required to enroll 100 percent of their 
MSP ship capacity and intermodal resources in VISA Stage III. (Ref. 19) More 
importantly, the 47-ship fleet that comprises MSP conveys approximately 110,000 TEUs 
(twenty-foot container equivalent units) or 10 million square feet of militarily useful deck 
space to DOD. (Ref. 20)  This equates to nearly 70 percent of VISA capacity.  
Altogether, the relevance of MSP to VISA; hence, DOD sealift capability is that it 
underpins VISA by guaranteeing sustainment sealift capacity that would be vital if the 
U.S. chose to “go it alone” in a contingency. (Ref. 21)  The Maritime Security Act of 
2003 expanded the number of U.S.-flag ships permissible under MSP to 60.  Under the 
revised program that takes effect in fiscal year (FY) 2006, participating carriers will 
receive incentives in the amount of $2.6 million per vessel through FY 2008; $2.9 million 
(FY 2009-11); $3.1 million FY 2012-15. (Ref. 22)   
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C. THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 
The Strategic Mobility Triad - Strategic Airlift, Strategic Sealift and Pre-
positioned Equipment is geared towards fulfilling the transportation objectives of DOD 
by capitalizing on the speed of airlift, the gross capacity of sealift, and the benefits and 
advantages of forward-staging or pre-positioning of war materiel.  The modality of airlift 
capitalizes on speed, while pre-positioning takes advantage of forward-staging of heavy 
equipment and support materiel.  For example, a standing goal of the Army is to deploy a 
brigade contingent to any operational theater in 96 hours. (Ref. 23)  Such a requirement 
can be met only through airlift.  However, each mode has its drawbacks.  Specifically, the 
movement of materiel via airlift is a high-cost option.  Considering that cost would be a 
secondary concern under conditions of national security and operational necessity, the 
practicality of transporting sufficient heavy equipment within required timelines would 
largely depend on available airlift capacity.   
In this regard, adequate airlift may be constrained by budget realities.  For 
example, it is not uncommon for Congress to fund a defense acquisition program at a 
level far lower than that requested by war-fighters and Combatant Commanders.  This 
was the reasoning behind Robert C. Owen’s contention that three tensions; high demand, 
fleet structure and budget affect airlift policy. (Ref. 24)  To this end, “effective airlift 
policy-making involves asking for what one can get instead of what one actually needs.” 
(Ref. 25)  As a consequence, airlift requirements will likely exceed the capacity 
demanded by war-fighters in a future conflict; thus, justifying the need for a robust sealift 
force that includes U.S.-flag commercial vessels and its associated globally networked 
intermodal infrastructure and management services. 
D. PREPOSITIONING 
As the third leg of the mobility triad, pre-positioning assets provides Combatant 
Commanders with the flexibility to respond to a specific threat using assets that are 
forward-staged in host nations (allies) or on vessels strategically located in nearby oceans 
(international waters) that can be quickly dispatched to trouble spots.  Since 2001, afloat 
pre-positioning has consisted of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF), the Combat 
Pre-positioning Force (CPF), and the Logistics Pre-positioning Force (LPF). (Ref. 26)   
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The Military Sealift Command oversees 36 pre-positioning ships. In the MPF 
configuration, 16 ships are organized into three squadrons whose primary function is to 
serve as a storehouse for the equipment and materiel for a contingent of 17,000 Marines 
that make up a Marine Air to Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  The CPF consists of 10 
ships loaded combat equipment and sustainment supplies for Army ground forces.  
Similarly, 10 ships comprise the LPF that stages materiel assets for the Navy, Air Force 
and the Defense Logistics Agency.  Overall, the key benefit of pre-positioning is that it 
shortens the response time required to transport materiel to war-fighters.  Despite these 
advantages, both the ashore and afloat pre-positioning option has its drawbacks.  First, 
ashore stocks are subjected to materiel obsolescence; present a target or are vulnerable to 
attack from enemy forces or internal extremist groups; political and diplomatic issues in 
host nation may limit conditions under which war materiel are used; staging materiel on 
foreign soil carries an implied U.S. commitment to defend the host-nation, which can 
discourage an ally from mounting their own self-defense. (Ref. 27)  Finally, afloat pre-
positioning is more costly than ashore staging.  More importantly, materiel staged aboard 
ships have to be adaptable to a greater number of conflicts, suggesting that there is a 
likelihood that the afloat pre-positioned stocks may not properly match the requirements 
of a given contingency. (Ref. 28)  
E. SEALIFT 
The point to be made by comparing and contrasting airlift and pre-positioning 
with sealift is to illustrate that despite its slower transit time, sealift is by far the most 
efficient and cost-effective mode of transporting military equipment.  What sealift gives 
up to airlift in terms of transit-time, it makes up for in sheer payload; especially cargo of 
the dry-bulk outsized variety – tanks and artillery.  For example, a CBO analysis 
estimated that to obtain the equivalent of the cargo space (250,000 square feet) possible 
on one large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship, it would take 160 to 225 C-17s.  In the 
same vein, the study suggested that to transport a 250,000 square feet load would entail 
the employment of 38 to 52 C-17 aircraft. (Ref. 29)   
A significant portion of this sealift capacity comes from the commercial carrier 
industry.  The reason is that there is simply not enough shipping capacity in the DOD 
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organic fleet.  For example, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm; 72 percent of the military 
dry cargo from the U.S. traveled by ship to their destinations in the Middle East. (Ref. 30)  
The organic or military vessel contingent was 60.76 percent and consisted of MSC Fast 
Sealift Ships (FSS), Prepositioned Ships, Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) and 
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels from MARAD.  To make up for any shortfall in 
organic capacity, the Military Sealift Command (MSC – one of three component 
commands of USTRANSCOM) chartered shipping from the commercial industry to 
move unit equipment and sustainment cargo.  As a result, materiel and equipment 
transported on U.S.-flag commercial ships comprised 12.68 percent of total Desert Shield 
/Desert Storm capacity.  Surprisingly, total foreign flag commercial capacity was 26.58 
percent – more than twice the commercial U.S.-flag capacity utilized. (Ref. 31)  It could 
not be determined from the research literature whether the greater usage of foreign-flag 
shipping was due to unavailability of U.S.-flag vessel capacity.   
The most current research data available on the ongoing Iraq War states that 40 
RRF vessels collectively transported 22 percent of the total Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) cargo. (Ref. 32)  Other key data points that add perspective to the achievements of 
sealift during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF are as follows: (1) Over 3 
million short tons of cargo were transported to the OIF/OEF operational theater during 
the period of September 2001 to February 2004; (2) Eighteen of the 20 LMSRs procured 
as a result of the MRS 05 recommendations made a total of 38 trips for a grand total of 
over 5.3 million square feet of materiel – 26 percent of the total DOD requirement. (Ref. 
33)  At a capacity of approximately 300,000 square feet, each LMSR in one trip 
transported the equivalent capacity of six Desert Shield/Desert Storm ships; greatly 
enhancing the organic sealift capability of DOD.  Altogether, 74 percent of the 3.1 
million short tons of cargo transported during OIF/OEF were accomplished via sealift. 
(Ref. 34)  
1. Organic Sealift Composition 
Organic sealift consists of vessels that are under government control or long-term 
charter.  Specifically, organic sealift are the prepositioned ships; Fast Sealift Ships (FSS); 
(LMSR) vessels, ships from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF); tankers; Lighter Aboard 
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Ships (LASH) and other vessels that provide military useful capacity.  These vessels 
provide DOD with emergency as well as surge response capabilities to deploy combat 
and support forces on short notice. 
a. National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) Composition 
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is a key component of 
DOD’s organic sealift capacity.  These vessels are maintained by MARAD and are 
comprised of inactive dry cargo ships, tankers, military auxiliaries, and other ship types 
that can be activated between 20 – 120 days in the event of a national emergency. (Ref. 
35)  As of September 30, 2003, the NDRF consisted of 297 vessels; down from a high of 
2,277 in 1950. (Ref. 36)   
b. Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Composition 
The readiness level (activation in <20 days) of Ready Reserve Force ships 
enable their employment in a surge capacity, making them a vital part of DOD sealift 
capability during a contingency or national emergency.  MARAD exercises control over 
RRF ships.  As a component of the NDRF, RRF vessels are maintained in a higher 
readiness state and are used for transporting unit and military equipment during the surge 
stage of a contingency. (Ref. 37)  Sixty-eight vessels comprise the RRF and are 
maintained in either a reduced operating status (ROS) or lay-up condition.  Ships in ROS 
status are manned with small crews (eight to nine personnel) to facilitate rapid activation 
according to a schedule of 4 or 5 days.  On the other hand, ships kept in lay-up condition 
(RRF-10, RRF-20, and RRF-30) do not have crews assigned and therefore, undergo a 
longer activation process - 10, 20 or 30 days that must be completed in a shipyard. 
2.    Commercial Sealift 
Commercial sealift can be broken down into two main categories: privately 
owned and operated U.S.-flag ships and foreign flag vessels. 
F. VISA AND CONTINGENCY SEALIFT 
Contingency sealift occurs according to the following priorities: (1) Prepositioned 
Ships, (2) Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), (3) Ready Reserve Force (RRF), (4) Volunteer U.S.-
Flag (5) Foreign Flag vessels, (6) Visa Stages I, II and III, (7) Requisitioning.  Pre-
positioned, FSS and RRF sealift are derived from DOD organic shipping assets; while 
capacity contributions to (4) through (7) are tapped from commercial capacity.   
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According to military planners, the response to a contingency or conflict take place in 
three distinct stages: In the first stage – commonly referred to as the halting phase; forces 
and high demand assets are deployed rapidly to the operational theater to defeat the initial 
attack and stop the advance of the enemy.  Under these circumstances, airlift is the 
primary means of transporting troops, high-demand materiel and equipment to the 
battlefield.  However, prepositioned assets from host-nation shore-based stores or 
maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) such as forward-deployed large, medium-speed 
roll-on/roll-off (LMSRs) and MSC charters are also used to meet the sealift needs of 
combatant commanders or war-fighters.  The second stage or buildup phase is executed 
with fast sealift ships (FSS) capable of traveling at speeds in excess of 30 knots; LMSRs 
and Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships under the operational control of MSC.  The third 
and final stage is sustainment and involves the use of U.S.-flag commercial carriers, as 
well as foreign flag commercial carriers to satisfy DOD capacity requirements.  Ships 
from the organic fleet would also be re-employed during this phase.   
This is also the stage where insufficient U.S.-flag and foreign flag commercial lift 
capacity might trigger the activation of VISA Stage I, if volunteered commercial capacity 
were not sufficient.  The diagram in Figure 3 illustrates the various stages of VISA 






Figure 3.   VISA Activation Diagram (From Ref. 38) 
  
 
G.  THE DECLINE OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
In an assessment of the state of the US Merchant Marine Fleet, the Maritime 
Administration made the prediction that the number of militarily useful dry cargo ships 
would continue to decline from a 1990 level of 168 to 35 by the year 2005. (Ref. 39)  The 
downward trend of the U.S. Maritime industry started during the post-World War II 
(WW II) period, where the U.S.-flag commercial fleet numbered around 2300 ships, but 
by 2002 had declined to 115 ships. (Ref. 40)  U.S.-flag commercial shipping also 
accounted for over 50 percent of the nation’s ocean-going commerce during the early 
post-WW II years, but these numbers have declined steadily over the years and as a 
result, have garnered the attention of U.S. policy makers and senior military logisticians.  
In fact, the decline in the number of U.S.-flag vessels not only impacts the commercial 
maritime industry, but also affects the number of trained U.S. mariners available to do the 
job during a national emergency or conflict.  To this end, the issue of risk is reiterated in 
Chapter II, sub-paragraph J and again in greater detail in Chapter III. 
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H. THE FLAG OF CONVENIENCE TREND 
The vastly changed security environment of the post-September 11, 2001 period 
has underscored the importance of maintaining a robust U.S. maritime policy to anchor 
the sealift capability of the DOD.  In a June 13, 2002 hearing before the Armed Services 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Maritime Administrator, Mr. 
William Schubert expressed concern over the lack of transparency in open registries. In 
other words, there was a disturbing trend in the proliferation of non-U.S.-flag shipping 
that had effectively contributed to the following state of affairs:  (1) Open registries 
controlled nearly 60 percent of the world merchant fleet; (2) During 2000, open registries 
occupied four of the top five registry positions in the industry; (3) In 2000, the U.S. 
ranked 12th place among registry nations of the world. (Ref. 41)  In a nutshell, the 
primary reason for the trend away from U.S.-flag or registered shipping is that costs 
related to construction, maintenance, environmental, safety standards are higher in the 
U.S. compared to foreign registries.  Reduced overall operating costs in the form of lower 
tax liabilities; lower registration fees; lower crew costs and liberal maritime laws are also 
factors in the declining U.S.-flag trend. (Ref. 42)  Schubert further contends that unlike 
countries with reputable or high registry standards, open registries can pose a risk of 
criminal or terrorist activity because owners do not need to have a connection or link to 
the country sponsoring the registry.   
This assertion is supported in the article titled Flags of Inconvenience in which 
Chris Gillis suggests that the inherent risks and security vulnerabilities that foreign 
flagged vessels pose to the United States may result from a multiplicity of vessel 
operation standards. (Ref. 43)  As a result, some security experts question the validity of 
documents offered up by foreign flagged carriers who enter U.S. ports in large numbers 
on a daily basis.  According to Gillis (2002, p. 60), the registered vessel owner is often 
only a shell entity that has no actual control of the vessel.  This would make it difficult at 
best to trace or establish a clear line of legal accountability in the event a convenience 
flagged vessel was used to perpetrate a terrorist act against the U.S.  In addition, a point 
was made that countries with lower registry standards made it difficult to determine who 
was manning the ships and what level of training the crew possessed.   
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The trends outlined above do not bode well for the U.S. maritime industry, 
because in the pursuit of profits and economic self-interest, carrier owners will seek a 
lower operating cost structure; which is achievable under a foreign registry.  Whether 
operating subsidies provided by MSP-VISA are the answer to the foreign registry trend 
remains an open question.  Based on the discussion outlined in the preceding paragraph, 
one can conclude that owners of MSP enrolled vessels are able to lower their financial 
and business risk because of the benefits received from the subsidy, as well as the priority 
access afforded to DOD peacetime business.  Similarly, DOD benefits from MSP by 
lowering its mobility (sealift) risk through the assured access guarantee to 100 percent of 
that vessel’s capacity in the event of VISA activation. 
There is also a level of security assuredness and risk-reduction benefit that 
accrues to the U.S. based on the higher registry standards required for MSP enrolled 
vessels.  For example, in the aftermath of the “9-11” environment, Congress is exploring 
various legislative approaches to close loopholes that allowed carriers to circumvent U.S. 
maritime regulations and standards that U.S. flagged vessels and other reputable 
international maritime operators have to follow.   
To this end, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Cost Parity Act of 2001 to 
ease the tax, wage; insurance and vessel inspection costs that U.S.-flag carriers have to 
bear. (Ref. 44) 
I. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION IN SEALIFT REVITALIZATION 
The aim of this paragraph is to outline the impact various items of legislation have 
had on the evolution of sealift within the context of the various relationships pursued by 
DOD with the commercial maritime industry.  Many of the laws were implemented 
during the early stages of the twentieth century and remain in effect as implemented or in 
amended forms.  In effect, many of the laws that will be discussed in the foregoing 
paragraphs have laid the foundation for the structure of VISA. 
For instance, the requirement to use U.S.-flag ships to transport all military cargo 
is based on the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904.  The exception to this requirement 
is when DOD determines that no U.S.-flag vessel is available. (Ref. 45)  The Cargo 
Preference Act of 1954 applies to government agencies and stipulates that at least 50 
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percent of the cargo must be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag vessels. (Ref. 46)  
In the case of humanitarian aid cargo, the requirement is 75 percent.  In each instance 
outlined previously, the cargo rates charged to the government or DOD must be 
reasonable. 
Compared to the legislation described in the previous paragraph, the Jones Act 
(Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) established rules for the transport of 
cargo between points in the U.S. – districts, territories and possessions. (Ref. 47)  
However, the constraints outlined in this item of legislation went a step further by 
requiring the vessels to not only be U.S-flag, but U.S.-built; U.S.-owned; U.S. citizen 
crewed. (Ref. 48)      
Passage of the Maritime Security Act of 1936 established the basis for 
maintaining a viable Merchant Marine to augment the naval capability of the U.S. in time 
of war or national emergency.  However, the post-World War II decline of available 
U.S.-flag commercial shipping provided the impetus for the amendment of the Maritime 
Security Act of 1936 with the passage of House Resolution (H.R. 1350).  The result was 
the Maritime Security Act of 1996 that set the stage for the establishment of the Maritime 
Security Program (MSP).  Administered by MARAD, 47 MSP contracts were initially 
apportioned among 10 U.S.-flag carriers or shipping companies.  To partially offset the 
cost of maintaining vessels under U.S.-flag registry, MSP participating carriers receive a 
$2.1 million annual subsidy for each ship enrolled along with priority access to DOD 
peacetime shipping.  In return, carriers agree to commit 100 percent of vessel capacity 
upon activation of VISA Stage III.    
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
played a crucial role in the streamlining of various fragmented mobility assets that 
resided under the control of the various services (Air Force, Army and Navy).  
Specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation provided the SECDEF with the authority 
to repeal the long-standing prohibition against consolidating transportation functions of 
military transportation commands. (Ref. 49)  This in turn paved the way for the 
establishment of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in July 
1987.   
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The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 laid the foundation that allowed 
VISA to function as a voluntary agreement between DOD and the Maritime industry.  
Specifically, this item of legislation provided the authorization for the Government, 
industry and labor to coordinate efforts to establish voluntary agreements in the pursuit of 
sealift capacity during a contingency. (Ref. 50)  In the event of VISA activation, the DPA 
also provides the statutory benefit of limited antitrust defense to participants. 
J. THE VISA PROGRAM AND CURRENT AND FUTURE SEALIFT RISKS 
Over the years the commercial industry has invested heavily in technology, 
infrastructure and intermodal services.  This system of services and management is 
integrated on a global scale; enabling carriers to achieve a level of shipping visibility, 
reliability and competence that would take years to replicate in a DOD organic 
environment, as well as be cost-prohibitive to maintain over the long-term.  This system 
of round-the-clock operation allows carriers to readily substitute vessels on a given route 
to mitigate capacity shortfalls.  The flexibility afforded by the high level of visibility that 
carriers have also reduces ship movement delays due to unforeseen technical difficulties 
or mechanical breakdowns. This transfers into a higher level of readiness and reduced 
risk for the DOD.  For example, a report issued by the Military Sealift Committee of the 
National Defense Transportation Association asserted that the global commercial 
intermodal system is in continuous operation.  For example, on any given day (other than 
Sunday) ships depart U.S. ports for destinations in the Middle East. (Ref. 51)  
The War Risk Insurance Program is another means of reducing the level of 
financial risk that commercial carriers operating on behalf of the U.S. government or 
DOD under conditions of war or contingency would have to bear.  To this end, the 2003 
value of the War Risk fund totaled over $37 million. (Ref. 52) 
In exploring the issue of risk as it relates to the use of U.S.-flag commercial 
shipping capacity operating in a contingency environment, the crucial questions that 
come to the forefront are: (1) What is the probability that VISA would be activated in the 
face of a given threat situation to the United States? (2) If activated, would VISA provide 
the level of capacity, efficiency and effectiveness that DOD expects? (3) Since VISA 
capacity is derived from MSP and non-MSP participants; what level of assuredness can 
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one expect among non-MSP carriers? In other words, would non-MSP carriers be willing 
to volunteer for VISA in large numbers and risk abandoning more lucrative and less risky 
commercial contracts and routes? (4) In view of the changed security environment of the 
post-“September 11, 2001” period and the retained option of the U.S. to “go it alone” 
during a contingency if necessary; what level of balking can one expect among potential 
VISA volunteers?  (5) Since U.S. Merchant Mariners will be expected to crew vessels in 
the RRF, NDRF and MSP fleet; what impact would this demand have on crews available 
for non-MSP VISA ships? (6) Can mariner skill and experience be a factor in the safety 
and preparedness of VISA volunteer vessels? (7) Could the average age of RRF vessels 
(>32 years as of 2001) affect organic fleet readiness, thereby creating a greater need or 
demand for capacity from the commercial industry?  
A review of MSC’s Lift Summary Reports from the Persian Gulf War for the 
period from August 7, 1990 to March 10, 1991 shows that 60.76 percent of dry cargo 
capacity was transported on DOD organic shipping.  U.S-flag commercial shipping 
transported 12.68 percent of capacity, while foreign flag commercial vessels accounted 
for the remaining 26.58 percent of total cargo capacity. (Ref. 53)  This suggests that 
utilization of non-U.S.-flag commercial shipping was high during Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm and that this tendency may again be adopted by USTRANSCOM/MSC in future 
contingencies.  In response to the organic capacity shortfalls identified during Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm and recommendations of the MRS BURU; the Clinton 
Administration earmarked over $20 billion towards the modernization of strategic 
mobility forces.  Specifically, 19 new LMSRs – each providing nearly 300,000 square 
feet of cargo deck space were to be purchased from 1997 to 2001.  This additional 
organic capacity reduces the risk of a shortfall in filling sealift requirements, but it also 
reduces the probability that VISA will be needed. 
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III. BACKGROUND THEORY 
A.  RISK 
1. Introduction 
Virtually all sealift decisions are made within the context of risk, because in 
effect, risk is a measure of potential inability to achieve desired objectives. (Ref.54)  Risk 
is also future-oriented: an un-materialized threat encompasses several unknown 
characteristics that have a probability of occurring at some point in the future and 
therefore, embodies risk.  Today, risk assessment and risk management are used by a 
variety of commercial business entities, as well as federal and local government 
organizations to help predict the chance of a system failing at some point in the future.   
The insurance industry was the first to apply risk management (actuarial tables) as 
a tool for executing its business strategy (Ref. 55).  Insurers are in the business of 
providing actuarial risk pooling through their major products such as life, 
property/casualty and health insurance, annuities, etc. (Ref. 56) The goal of risk 
management in the insurance industry is to offer viable economic reasons for firm 
managers to engage themselves with not only expected profit but with the distribution of 
firm returns around their expected value. (Ref. 57) That is, insurance assists managers in 
valuing risk probabilities (percentiles) as contingencies. 
In risk management, the insurance industry begins by identifying the risks 
involved in providing insurance services. These risks are broken down into two 
categories viz. actuarial risks and financial risks. (Ref. 58) The latter includes asset risk, 
pricing risk, asset/liability matching risk, and miscellaneous risk. While the former, 
includes systematic risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and legal risks. The 
insurance companies then use tools such as simulation to model various scenarios that 
have influence on the various risks based on the type of risk. For example, for the 
asset/liability matching (liquidity) risk, some insurance companies modeled various 
interest rate scenarios to measure the net cash flow. (Ref. 59) The various net cash flow 
values were then aggregated and put on a distribution. Negative net cash flows will 
represent the unfavorable outcome, hence risk. Thus, a firm manager may want a small 
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risk; e.g. no more than 5th-percentile that net cash flow outcomes may be negative. In this 
example, the 5th-percentile is the amount of risk the firm manager would be willing to 
take. That is, the probability of a negative net cash flow outcome must be less than the 
5th-percentile of the entire distribution of outcomes.  
The use of risk assessment and management soon spread to other areas of 
business and society as knowledge became more widespread and accepted.  Risk 
management first formally found its way into the Navy in the early 90’s as operational 
risk management (ORM). The current ORM instruction authorized by the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAVINST 3500.39A, 2000, 1) states that “uncertainty and risk are 
inherent in the nature of military action…success is based upon a willingness to balance 
risk with opportunity.” (Ref. 60)  The Naval Safety Center was the first Navy 
organization to recognize the utility of ORM and adopted it to help mitigate the inherent 
risks present in naval aviation.   
Today, risk management is integrated into the decision-making of virtually every 
defense organization as managers seek ways to mitigate contingencies. Thus, the logistics 
arm of the Department of Defense (DOD), USTRANSCOM, now also uses risk 
management to mitigate any risks associated with transportation of military cargo. By 
mitigating the risk, USTRANSCOM may decrease the probability that the material will 
not reach its destination on time. If the military cargo does not reach the battlefield on 
time the U.S. may lose its competitive advantage on the battlefield. 
2.  Risk in Logistics and Mobility 
In serving the logistics and strategic mobility needs of the DTS, USTRANSCOM 
must be prepared to provide sealift, airlift and surface transportation, both globally and 
domestically for U.S forces; often on short notice or within the constraints of compressed 
timelines. During peacetime, the factors of time relative to available transportation assets 
are not as critical an issue as they are in time of conflict.  For example, the number of 
U.S.-flag ships that would be available to MSC in time of conflict has always been an 
area of concern to decision makers.  For example, in a special report to the Strom 
Thurmond Institute, (Whitehurst 2001, p. 5) contended that the number of militarily 
useful U.S.-flag merchant vessels amounted to only 342.  This number was in stark 
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contrast to the Maritime Administration’s year 2000 estimate of a U.S-flag fleet 
numbering between 29,000 and 37,000 vessels over 1,000 tons.  The significance of the 
foregoing claim is that a gross overestimation of available ship capacity would pose a 
significant risk to mobility in the event of a crisis.  Another cautionary point is that “the 
VISA program is activated only after MSC, RRF and volunteer ships (U.S. and foreign) 
are deemed insufficient” (Ref. 61) Of equal importance is whether the available ships are 
of the right type (Roll-on Roll-off, LASH or break bulk) for the intended mission and 
operating environment.  In a nutshell, these questions all relate to the subject of risk. 
How then does one classify, assess and manage risk to meet the requirements of 
DOD’s Global Transportation Network?  A solution to the preceding question lies in the 
immense capability of the Defense Transportation System (DTS), which is underpinned 
by the service triad of AMC, MSC, and SDDC.  The mission statement of 
USTRANSCOM clearly states that its purpose is “to provide air, land, and sea 
transportation for DOD, both in time of peace and time of war.” (Ref. 62)  It is one thing 
to discuss the concept of risk as it relates to transportation in general.  However, when the 
subject of war is included in the mix, the number variables that can affect a given 
decision grow exponentially.  For starters, military decision makers have to determine 
how best to employ the scarce transportation resources to meet the variable requirements 
and demands of each service entity.  In this case, risk of failure or consequences is not 
just about competitive advantage, market share and threatened survival as in the 
commercial industry; but of fulfilling operational requirements for deployed U.S. forces 
wherever it is needed – delivered at the right place and at the right time.  These 
operational outcomes are the measures that truly define logistics and transportation risk. 
B. RISK QUANTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT 
1. Risk Quantification 
a. Statistics  
The study of statistics refers to the collection, presentation, analysis and 
use of numerical data to infer and make decisions based on sample observations, where 
the actual population is not known. (Ref. 63) A population is defined as a group of all 
possible items or observations of interest to a statistical practitioner. (Ref. 64) For 
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example, it could refer to a population of container ships that sail the North America to 
Asia route. A descriptive measure of a population is known as a parameter. For instance, 
the parameter of interest in the population of ships that sail a specific route could be the 
mean quantity of goods carried on all the ships on that route. However, since it is not 
always feasible to examine the entire population, a sample of the population can be 
examined instead, and statistics used to draw inferences from the sample to the 
population. 
b. Statistics of Risk 
(1) Range. The range is the difference between the most 
extreme outcomes i.e. the largest value and the smallest value. (Ref. 65) The range is, 
therefore, a measure of risk because it measures the spread of the outcomes. However, 
the range is not a popular measure of risk because it only considers the most extreme 
values and neglects the values in between. (Ref. 66) 
(2) The Standard Deviation. The standard deviation is a 
measure of the average variation of outcomes from the expected value – the mean. The 
standard deviation is the more popular and accurate measurement of risk. When the 
standard deviation increases, the distributional width or variance also increases. That is, 
the variation of possible outcomes also increases; therefore, the greater the risk. (Ref. 67) 
(3) Coefficient of Variation. The coefficient of variation is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the expected value or mean. The measure 
of risk is applicable when the estimates of the variables, their measures, magnitudes, or 
units differ. (Ref. 68) 
c.  Probability Distributions 
Probability distributions are used to represent the whole pattern of 
variability in a population. (Ref. 69) A probability distribution is a table, formula, or 
graph that describes the possible values of a random variable and their respective 
probabilities. These values are, in turn, used to compute the mean and the variance of the 
population. The population mean is the weighted average of all its values where the 
weights are the probabilities. The population mean is also known as the expected value. 
(Ref. 70)  
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(1) Types of Probability Distributions. There are two types of 
probability distributions namely discrete and continuous. Discrete probability 
distributions are used when a random variable can be assumed to only take distinct 
values, usually integers as possible values, with no intermediate values possible. 
Continuous probability distributions, on the other hand, assume the possibility that the 
random variable may take an infinite number of possible values within a range. (Ref. 71) 
(2) Selecting a Probability Distribution. Another way to 
categorize distributions is as being either empirical or analytical.  Empirical distributions 
are based on data, usually observations from a sample, without necessarily conforming to 
any pre-determined mathematical function to describe the relationship between the 
possible values and their attendant probabilities.  Analytical distributions can be 
described with mathematical functions that usually have some sort of theoretical basis. 
Arena®, the simulation tool that was used in this analysis, allows the user to choose from 
seventeen types of analytical probability distributions, or to specify an empirical 
distribution. However, only a few of these are usually used. For the intents and purposes 
of this study, only the following analytical distributions will be used: normal, uniform 
and triangular. These probability distributions have different shapes that characterize 
different types of risk since the variability possible outcomes represent in a distribution 
represent the risk. Empirical distributions will discussed (as well as other analytical 
distributions) briefly again in Chapter V, when estimating risk percentiles.   
(a) Uniform Distribution. The uniform distribution describes an 
outcome that is equally likely to fall anywhere between a minimum and a maximum 
value. (Ref. 72) That is, there is an equal probability that all values of an outcome will 
fall between the minimum and maximum value. Furthermore, this distribution is used 
when the maximum and minimum values are fixed. (Ref. 73)  
(b) Normal Distribution. The normal distribution describes an 
outcome that is most likely to be in the middle of the distribution, with progressively 
smaller likelihoods or probabilities moving away from the most likely value – the mean. 
(Ref. 74) The normal distribution is used when the following conditions are satisfied:  
• Some value of the uncertain variable is the most likely i.e. 
the mean of the distribution. 
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• The uncertain variable could as likely be above the mean as 
it could be below the mean i.e., the uncertain variable is 
symmetrical about the mean. 
• The uncertain variable is more likely to be close to the 
mean than further away. (Ref. 75)  
 
(c) Triangular Distribution. The triangular distribution describes an 
outcome that has a minimum and a maximum value. However, the outcome is most likely 
to occur at an intermediate point. This distribution is well suited to situations where the 
most likely outcome, as well as the smallest and largest possible outcomes, can be 
identified. (Ref. 76) There are three conditions that underlie the triangular distribution 
namely: 
• The minimum number of items is fixed. 
• The maximum number of items if fixed. 
• The most likely number of items falls between the 
minimum and the maximum values, forms a triangular-
shaped distribution, which shows that the values towards 
the minimum and maximum are less likely to occur than 
those near the most likely value. (Ref. 77)  
 
(3) Interpretation of the Parameters of the Distributions. 
(a) The Center of the Distribution – The First Moment. The 
first moment of the distribution measures the expected value of the possible outcomes. 
Common statistics of the first moment include the mean, median, and the mode. The 
mean is the average value of all the outcomes; the median is the center of the distribution; 
and the mode is the most frequently occurring value. The first moment of a distribution is 
commonly measured by the mean ( )µ or average value as shown in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4.   The First Moment (From Ref. 79) 
 
(b) The Spread of the Distribution – The Second Moment. 
The second moment measures the variation or spread of the outcomes from the 
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expected value, which is a measure of risk. This measure of risk is also known as 
the standard deviation ( )σ . The standard deviation is a measure of the variation of 
outcomes from the expected value. That is, it measures the potentiality that the 
outcomes will fall into different regions of the distribution. A higher standard 
deviation means that there is a great variation in possible outcomes. A great 
variation in possible outcomes, in turn, means that there is greater risk. (Ref. 79) 
Therefore, Figure 5 below shows that the solid line has a higher standard 
deviation while the dotted graph has a lower one. This means that the former has 
less risk while the latter has more risk. For example, say the two graphs represent 
two shipping companies (Company A – dotted line and Company B – solid line) 
both with the same expected delivery times. Using Company B is more risky 
because it has a greater fluctuation (standard deviation) of potential outcomes 
(delivery times) than Company A.  
 
 
Figure 5.   The Second Moment (From Ref. 81) 
 
d. The Relationship of the First and Second Moment in 
Determining Operational Risk 
Consider Figure 4 once more, and assume the two graphs represent two 
shipping companies with different distributions in the amount of material delivered on 
time to a particular port.  The first firm, indicated by the distribution on the left, delivers 
less material on average to the port, but an equal amount of variability, or risk in the 
amount of material delivered (σ). Now note that, even though the risk in the two 
distributions is the same, the probability of obtaining a particular value is quite different.  
For example, in the first distribution, there is a 50% chance of obtaining a value (amount 
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of material delivered) less than µ1.  However, the second company has only a negligible 
chance of delivering less than µ1 material.  
Similarly, by adding more ships, VISA will effectively shift the 
distribution of performance, and reduce the probability (percentile) of delivering less than 
the required amount of material. Also, for the same amount of risk, one would predict a 
greater amount of material delivered on time. 
e. The Need for Simulation 
A simulation is capable of not only describing what the outcomes of a 
given decision could be, but also the probability with which these outcomes will occur. 
Simulations are used to generate statistics that can be analyzed. Furthermore, simulations 
result in the entire probability distribution of outcomes. (Ref. 81) These distributions can 
then be interpreted using the methods discussed in the part c of this section. The 
interpretations will then define the types of risks that are involved in the process, in this 
case, the transportation of military cargo. 
f. Simulation Analysis 
(1) Simulation Input and Modeling. The distributions discussed in 
part d of this chapter will be used as input to the simulation model in Chapter IV. The 
two graphs in Figure 5, above, may describe outcomes from two scenarios from a 
different amount of risk sources. These risk sources will be discussed in Section D of this 
chapter. Thus, in the simulation, one scenario was set in which the model of risk was 
constrained – “best-case” scenario and another where more comprehensive risk was used 
– “risk contingent” scenario. The solid line might represent the “risk contingent” scenario 
while the dotted line would be the result of a “best-case” scenario. Although the average 
delivery time is the same, any particular delivery time (Quantile) would have a much 
greater risk (percentile) of not being met in the “risk contingency” scenario. 
(2) Percentile Analysis. A percentile is a statistic that describes 
how the data are spread over the interval from the smallest value to the largest value in 
percentage increments. For example, if data does not have numerous repeated values, the 
pth percentile divides the data into two parts. The pth percentile is defined as a value such 
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that at least p percent of the observations are less than or equal to this value and at least 
(100 – p) percent of the observations are greater than or equal to this value. (Ref. 82) 
(3) Quantile Analysis. According to Gibbons (Ref. 83), a Quantile 
of a continuous distribution of a random variable is a real number that divides the area 
under the probability density function into two parts of specified amounts. However, only 
the area to the left of the number need be specified since the entire area in equal to 1. In 
general, a q-Quantile of a random variable X is any value x such that the probability of 
the random variable (x) being less than or equal to the value (x) is q. (Ref. 84)  
(4) The Goodness-of-Fit Test. There are various Goodness-of-fit 
tests that can be used to test the accuracy of the simulation model. These include, but are 
not limited to, the chi-square test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Cramer-von Mises test. For 
the purpose of this paper, the Anderson-Darling statistic, which is part of the Cramer-von 
Mises family, is used to test. The Cramer-von Mises family statistics is known as 
quadratic statistics and is based on Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) Statistics. 
(Ref. 85) According to Stephens, “EDF statistics are measures of the discrepancy 
between the EDF and a given distribution, and are used for testing the fit of the sample to 
the distribution…” (Ref. 86) 
2. Risk Assessment  
Risk assessment is the process of identifying and analyzing program areas and 
critical technical process risk to increase the probability of meeting the (VISA) 
operation’s cost, schedule and performance objectives. In addition, risk assessment is 
further broken into two parts: risk identification and risk analysis. Risk identification is 
the process of examining the program areas and each critical technical process to identify 
and document the associated risk. On the other hand, risk analysis is the process of 
examining each identified risk issue or process to refine the description of the risk, 
isolating the cause, and determining the consequences. (Ref. 87) 
C. RISK ASSESSMENT IN VISA  
When VISA is activated, there is a sequence of events that needs to take place. 
For starters, the military cargo that needs to be transported to the war zone has to be taken 
to the CONUS ports. This is accomplished by using the intermodal systems that are part 
of the VISA global network, which includes trucking, rail assets, intermodal terminals, 
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etc. (Ref. 88) Thereafter, the cargo will be loaded onto U.S.-flag commercial ships that 
are enrolled in VISA. These ships will then sail along their international routes to the 
region which U.S. national interests may be placed at risk. Once, the cargo arrives at the 
destination it will be unloaded and placed in the hands of the U.S. troops. This is 
provided everything goes according to plan.  
When U.S. forces become engaged in armed conflict, they will be heavily 
dependent on the supplies provided the commercial shipping logistics supply lines to 
fight and win. Therefore, any break in the supply lines will have dire consequences for 
the troops on the front lines. That is a risk the U.S. is not prepared to take. As a result, the 
VISA program has to come up with a risk management to deal with the potential risk that 
is associated with the activation. The objective of this risk management would be to 
identify the risk associated with VISA activation; managing that risk by mitigation or 
prevention. The goal of the risk management is to keep risk to a minimum in order to 
keep the logistic supply lines open and functional for the entire duration of the conflict(s). 
There are potential risks associated with various stages of the logistic supply line 
and/or the VISA process. The risk drivers will then be identified. Thereafter, the various 
risks caused by a certain/specific driver will be identified. These risks will then be 
assessed to find out what the probability of the risk occurring is and what the 
consequences of the risk will be in the event that it occurs. Thereafter, the risk will be 
mitigated and the results of the mitigation will be monitored during risk monitoring stage. 
The purpose of the monitoring is to assess the risk mitigation steps that were taken to 
check whether they are effective or not. If not, then new mitigation steps will be taken to 
deal with the risk. 
1. Risk Identification 
As mentioned earlier, the sequence of events that takes place after VISA 
activation is as follows: (1) the military cargo is transported to the CONUS ports; (2) the 
cargo is loaded onto VISA participant ships; (3) the ships set sail on their commercial 
routes to the ports of debarkation; (4) The cargo is unloaded; (5) the cargo is the loaded 
on another ship (controlled by SDDC) that will take it to the point of conflict. However, 
for the purpose of this study, the authors have assumed that the military cargo is already 
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at the ports awaiting ships in order to simplify the problem. Also, since U.S.-flag ships 
enrolled in VISA will transport cargo along their normal commercial routes; risk event 
(4) will not be incorporated into the analysis for further simplification. Therefore, this 
sequence of events can be further simplified into three parts: loading (CONUS ports), 
sailing, and unloading (Bremerhaven, Italy, Singapore, etc.). In addition, these events can 
be viewed as risk events. Table 1 shows some examples of risk that might occur after 
VISA activation. The authors brainstormed these examples. 
 
Table 1.     Risk Events and Risks associated with VISA activation 
Risk Event (1): Loading at port of 
embarkation 
• Ship Availability 
• Crane failure 
• Ships arriving late 
• Wrong type of ship 
• Port workers strike 
• War protestors/Greenpeace block 
harbor 
• Insufficient port capacity 
• Sabotage/Terrorism 
Risk Event (2): Sailing • Engine failure 
• Adverse weather conditions (rough 
seas) 
• Pirates 
• U.S. merchant marines crew 
availability 
Risk Event (3): Unloading at transfer port • Same as Risk Event (2) 
Risk Event (4): Load cargo onto SDDC 
controlled ships. 
• Availability of U.S.-flag ships 
• Correct type of ships available 
 
Given the high level of on-time performance observed with commercial shipping, 
one may presume that under normal circumstances, the various commercial shipping 
companies have already incorporated buffers into their schedules to deal with normal 
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risk.  Whether those buffers are sufficient to deal with the sorts of risk exemplified in 
Table 1 is an open question. This question will be addressed in part, by assuming those 
buffers are not sufficient when the ‘risk contingency’ scenario is examined in Chapters 
IV and V. 
2. Risk Analysis 
One of the risks associated with the loading stage is the possibility of a container 
crane failure. Failure of a crane could hamper the port operations and thus delay the 
loading process. Therefore, the reliability of the cargo handling equipment is very 
important. In addition, ports have multiple numbers of cranes at different docking 
stations. According to Liebherr (Ref. 89), a crane manufacturer, their gantry container 
cranes have high reliability/availability with the Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) 
being less than 0.5% per annum. The ports of Los Angeles, Houston, Norfolk and 
Oakland use similar cranes for cargo handling. Therefore, the probability of a crane 
failure is very low. In addition, should one of the cranes fail, the port could use another 
docking station. As a result, there overall risk rating for crane failure is low risk. (Ref. 90) 
The issue of labor disputes affecting port operations is a serious one. A strike at 
the ports of embarkation could seriously affect the loading and unloading of ships. The 
strike would cause the harbor to shut down and delay the loading of the ships and thus 
cause a disruption in the supply line. An example of this is the strike that shut down the 
entire U.S. west coast, from San Diego to Seattle in October 2002. (Ref. 91) This labor 
dispute halted all port operations and caused ships filled with import goods to lie 
anchored offshore. A disruption in the supply line will have significant consequences to 
the troops on the front lines. Therefore, the issue of a harbor strike is given a medium risk 
rating because it is likely to happen again sometime in the future and it will have 
significant consequences if it happens during VISA activation. 
The vulnerabilities exposed by the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated 
the scope of the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations.  No one could have 
imagined that terrorists would use aircraft as missiles to bring down a building.  The 
same analogy can be made in the case of a ship in the hand of a terrorist that is allowed to 
sneak in to a U.S. port.  In fact, in October 2000 terrorists hinted at targeting the maritime 
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industry by placing a boat full of explosives next to the USS Cole that lay anchored on 
the shore of Yemen and then blew a hole into its hull. There is no reason to think that 
terrorists will never do this again. Therefore, the issue of sabotage at the ports of 
embarkation has very serious consequences, and is likely to happen in future. As a result, 
sabotage has been given a high-risk rating. This risk of maritime terrorism could also 
affect the shipping capacity in that some commercial shipping companies could be 
discouraged from volunteering their ships. 
A study by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has found that sea 
ports are a major source of U.S. urban pollution. The study found that ten of the major 
U.S. seaports had increasing levels of pollution. Therefore, this will likely outrage 
environmental activists and cause them to protest the harbors. Furthermore, there seems 
to be a growing anti-war sentiment in the U.S. and in the world, which has caused many 
people to protest. Anti-war protesters who were protesting against commercial shipping 
companies that had ties to the military action in the Iraq war shut down parts of the 
Oakland port, one of the major west coast U.S. ports, on May 13 2003. (Ref. 92) 
Therefore, as long as there are people who disagree with war, pollution, etc, protests are 
certainly going to occur in future. These protests can cause significant disruptions in port 
operations as demonstrated by the Oakland port protest. Hence, protests have been given 
a high-risk rating. 
The issue of port capacity has been given a low risk rating. The reason for this is 
because the VISA program uses commercial ships that already have their own established 
terminals at the various ports. Furthermore, since the ships will be operating on their 
normal commercial schedule, there will be no need for the port to handle more ships at a 
given time. Therefore, under VISA activation, it is unlikely that any port will need to 
increase its capacity beyond the current throughputs. Also, the consequences of a low 
throughput caused by low port capacity are moderate i.e. minor delays. The reason for 
this is due to the fact that if a ship is delayed at, say, the Oakland port, another one could 
start sailing from another port e.g. Los Angeles. 
The advent of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology has meant that ships 
can now pinpoint their exact location anywhere at sea. Also, recent improvements in 
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weather forecasting now allow multiple days forecast for any part of the world. The 
National Weather Services (NWS) Ocean Prediction Center (OPC) continually monitors 
and analyzes maritime data then issues marine warnings, forecasts and guidance in text 
and graphical format for maritime users. Therefore, the GPS technology coupled with the 
marine warnings and forecasts allow ships to circumnavigate or prepare for any adverse 
weather conditions at sea be it high waves, storms, etc. Hence, the issue of adverse 
weather at sea has been declared a medium risk to the VISA operation. The reason for 
this is because it is likely there will be storms, high seas, etc at sea. The consequences, on 
the other hand, will be moderate because there is a great chance that the adverse weather 
locations will be identified thus avoided. This will cause minor delays in the delivery of 
the cargo. 
The ships’ timely arrival at port is contingent on where in the international oceans 
the ships are located at the time VISA is activated. The ships will therefore need time to 
deliver their cargo and then get back to the U.S. ports in order to start loading the military 
cargo. This will cause some delays in the loading and hence delivery of the military 
cargo. However, these ships are also involved in the daily transportation of commercial 
cargo that makes their processes very efficient in order to minimize cost. This means that 
the likelihood of ships arriving late, though possible, is remote. However, as mentioned 
before, the issues of adverse weather and ships equipment problems could occasionally 
delay the ships. The consequences of a delayed ship arrival at the port of embarkation and 
debarkation are significant because the nature of military operations is urgent as people’s 
lives are at stake. Therefore, the issue of ship timely arrival has been declared a low risk. 
The risk associated with engine failure has been given a medium risk rating 
because engine failure is unlikely to occur. The reason for this is because the commercial 
shipping industry is extremely competitive. Therefore, the risk of losing a ship is far 
greater for a commercial company because it means that they will not be able to deliver 
cargo usually worth hundreds of millions to its customers. This could have dire 
consequences for their business because a ship out of service earns no income. As a 
result, the commercial shipping companies are incentivized to keep their vessels in 
efficient operating condition. They accomplish this by performing preventative or 
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planned maintenance on their vessels. However, as mentioned earlier, if anything can go 
wrong, chances are it will. Thus one cannot rule out completely, the possibility of an 
engine failure. Hence, if engine failure does in fact occur then its consequences will be 
significant because the delivery of much needed military cargo will be delayed 
indefinitely.  
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) report, pirate attacks on 
ships have tripled from 1993 to 2003. (Ref. 93) Indonesian waters were found to be the 
most dangerous, followed by Bangladesh and Nigeria. Indonesia also lies in the Asia-
Pacific route that will be used by some of the commercial ships carrying military cargo. 
Therefore, ships that sail the Asia-Pacific route are vulnerable to piracy. As a result, the 
threat of piracy has been declared a high risk because it is likely to happen. Furthermore, 
the consequences of such an event are severe to the military because, should pirates take 
over the ship, the military cargo being transported could end up in the wrong hands – the 
hands of terrorists.  
The issue of merchant marine availability has been given a medium risk rating 
because the ships used for VISA Stage I are U.S.-flag ships manned by U.S. merchant 
marines. Therefore the likelihood that merchant marines will be unavailable is unlikely. 
That is, as long as there are U.S.-flag ships available to transport the military cargo, there 
will be merchant marines to man them. However, since VISA has never been activated 
there is no guarantee that the U.S.-flag commercial ships will indeed volunteer their 
capacity to DOD in the time of war. This will, in turn, impact the number of U.S. 
merchant marines. Therefore, the consequences of not having merchant marines are 
significant because in that event the U.S. will have to entrust their sensitive military cargo 
on foreign nationals. That is simply not acceptable in a post-9/11 world and when the 
U.S. has to retain its ability to “go it alone”.  
The risk ratings for the port of debarkation are similar but generally higher than 
those at the port of embarkation. The reason for this is that the U.S. will has no effective 
control over protestors, striking port workers, etc in those regions. In addition, U.S. laws 
such as Title 46; CFR Chapter II Part 340.6 that gives DOD priority use of the U.S. ports 
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does not apply to the ports of debarkation thus potential problems and/or delays could be 
aggravated. 
The risks associated with risk event (4), the transfers of military cargo to local, 
intra-region feeder vessels are the availability of U.S.-flag ships and availability of the 
correct type of ship.  U.S.-flag commercial ships are limited to their commercial routes 
because they will be carrying not only the military cargo but commercial goods as well. 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that they will transport the military cargo all the way to 
the point of conflict. Thus the military cargo will have to be transferred to local, intra-
region feeder vessels that are unlikely to be U.S.-flag. Therefore, once again, the U.S. 
will have to entrust their military cargo on foreign registered ships. The cargo could fall 
into the hands of terrorists or the enemy and thus compromise the United States’ 
advantage in the conflict(s). As a result, the issue of availability of U.S.-flag ships has 
been declared a high risk factor. On the other hand, the issue of having the correct type of 
feeder vessel has been declared a medium risk because its consequences are significant 
but is unlikely to happen because of the frequency of commercial shipping transport. 
3. Risk Rating Matrix 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are two components to every risk event, 
the likelihood (probability) that the event will happen, and the consequences of the event 
happening. These two components can be used to construct a Risk Rating matrix (Figure 
6).  
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The following Risk Rating Matrices shown below (Figures 7-10) refer to the risk 
ratings given to the specific risks associated with every step i.e. risk events of the VISA 
operation. The rationales for the risk ratings were discussed in the Risk Analysis section.  
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Figure 7.   Risk Event (1): Loading cargo at the port of embarkation 
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Figure 8.   Risk Event (2): Sailing 
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Figure 9.   Risk Event (3): Unloading at port of debarkation 
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Figure 10.   Risk Event (4): Transfer of cargo to local, intra-region feeder vessels 
 
The U.S. Government has no choice but to deal with the risks associated with the 
VISA program. One way of finding out how these various risks will affect the whole 
military cargo transportation operation is to activate VISA program and then record any 
problems that arise. The data recorded could then be analyzed and then used to improve 
and make changes to the process. Furthermore, the information gathered could be used to 
mitigate any future risk that might occur. However, since the VISA has never been 
activated before, there is no available data or information as to how the various risks will 
affect the transportation process.  
Therefore, the only option is to simulate the VISA activation using a computer 
based simulation model, in this case, Arena 8.0. The reason for this is because 
simulations will not only demonstrate what the outcomes or consequences of a given 
decision could be, but also the probability with which the outcomes will occur. (Ref. 94) 
All the various risk factors and sources will be quantified i.e. given probability 
distributions and then entered into the simulation model to see how each one affects the 
VISA process. The results gathered from this simulation will then be analyzed in Chapter 
IV to see how the various risks affected the overall transportation process. 
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IV. THE ARENA MODEL 
A. THE ARENA MODEL FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION 
1. Problem Formulation 
In order to develop a simulation model, the client (SDDC/MSC) was approached 
to find their requirements.  This was done at a MBA project meeting held at the SDDC in 
Fort Eustis, Virginia on September 16, 2004.  The initial plan involved modeling the 
MSP participation in Stage III of the VISA Program.  However, SDDC/MSC was more 
interested in the development of a useful tool that would assist in the operational 
assessment of VISA Stage I. This resulted in the re-focusing of efforts to model VISA 
Stage I. 
In order to model Stage I, the relevant data for 126 ships that were participants in 
the VISA Program was collected.  This data contained inter alia the ship capacity, speed 
etc.  (See Appendix D for this data).  The commercial schedule for the carriers was 
determined by looking at the website for each carrier and locating each VISA ship on the 
carrier’s schedule.  This data was consolidated into a useful form.  (See Appendix A11 
for this data).  The current commercial trade routes were used for in simulation.  There 
was no deviation from the trade routes so as to simulate the real world situation. 
The scope of the project was to provide a tool that MSC/SDDC could use to 
analyze VISA Stage I performance in various two-theater scenarios.  As the scenarios in 
question were classified, it became evident that the model could be adopted applied as a 
generic tool for later use.  To this end, the analysis of data in this project is intended as a 
‘proof of concept’ validation and not as a detailed analysis of a genuine two-theater 
scenario.  Given the foregoing limitations and due to the relatively high number of 
carriers (48 in FY 2000) participating in the VISA Program, the model would be too 
complex if all the carriers were modeled with all their trade routes.  As a result, only a 
few major VISA participants were selected along with their corresponding trade routes.  
This was seen as a representative sample to validate the model.  In order to ensure that 
the sample was indeed representative, data on all 126 VISA ships was gathered and their 
corresponding trade routes were also determined.  For simplicity, the model was limited 
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to the 2 to 4 major carriers and 4 to 8 different routes they follow.  Only the carriers that 
were most representative of the population were selected for the model. 
2. Simulation Objectives 
The objective of the simulation study is to provide SDDC/MSC with an 
operational planning tool for the Stage I of the VISA program.  This simulation would aid 
SDDC/MSC in assessing the impact of route capacity, commercial schedules, material 
transfer requirements and protection level all for the case of a two-theater war scenario.  
The simulation would be based on representation of the actual commercial shipping 
schedules and operations as of the October 2004.  The simulation is intended to be an 
operational tool that would benefit the SDDC/MSC in their planning.  The simulation 
does not intend to replace any existing procedures/processes.  However, it can provide 
SDDC/MSC with an operating tool that can be used to manipulate the material transfer 
requirements and the timelines for a various deployment scenarios.  Statistical analysis 
shall also be performed on the output to see the level of mission accomplishment 
(protection level achieved in terms of the transportation of the military material) within 
certain constraints. 
3. Boundaries 
During the initiation of the project the first and major concern was where to draw 
the system boundary.  After some discussion it was decided to draw the system boundary 
around the harbor of embarkation and debarkation.  In other words, the intermodal 
activities to get the material to the port of embarkation, as well as the intermodal 
activities to get the material from its port of debarkation, to the combatant, have been 
specifically excluded from any detailed analysis.  This is as the intermodal activities are 
beyond the scope of this study and furthermore would require as separate and more 
complex study.  The analysis however includes a “risk contingency” case scenario.  In 
that scenario, there is a delay module at all harbors to simulate an interrupted schedule 
due to factors that may include problems due to intermodal activities.  This is therefore a 
“black box” approach for the intermodal activities. 
Another boundary was set to limit the number of carriers to maximum 4.  The 
third boundary was to limit the number of routes chosen to those that were undertaken by 
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US flag ships only.  This limits the scope of the investigation to transport by VISA ships 
only.  As there are many ports of interest that are not served by VISA ships, the cargo are 
transferred from these vessels to local intra-region vessels. These intra-region vessels 
then transport the cargo from the VISA port to the port nearest to operations. However, 
since the project was limited to VISA ships only, the intra-region vessel routes were not 
modeled. Nevertheless, each carrier had several different routes that they operated e.g. 
the APL carrier had approximately 10 routes to South East Asia, and many more to other 
parts of the globe.  The model was limited to only one route to South East Asia for APL.  
This limitation was applied to other carriers – Maersk American Roll-On-Roll-Off 
Carrier LLC.  The fourth boundary is not independent from the second boundary. 
Therefore, limits were established for the port of embarkation for each carrier from West 
CONUS and the other from East CONUS only.  These ports were Los Angeles and 
Houston respectively for the APL carrier. 
The requirement was to develop the model to handle a two-theatre war scenario.  
The project group chose the two ports of debarkation for the two-theatre war scenario for 
illustration purposes only.  These choices do not imply in any way an actual war scenario 
ever to be undertaken or planned.  On the other hand, the ports chosen were Singapore 
(one of the hubs for South East Asia) and the Gioia (Italy). 
During the initial planning (MSP approach), Karachi was chosen as the port of 
debarkation.  This however posed a problem in the sense that there was no direct route to 
Karachi using a US Flag carrier.  The US Flag stopped at the hub in Singapore and the 
material was transferred to foreign-flag ships to Karachi.  It was for this reason that 
Singapore was chosen as the Port of debarkation instead of Karachi (note the third 
boundary again). 
The initial boundaries were set as follows: no intermodal activities, two-theatre 
war, four major carriers and two routes for each carrier, completing the definition of all 
performance metrics. As a result, two kinds of performance metrics were relevant. (Ref. 
95)  For example, metrics that measure the quality of the system as well as metrics that 
measure the success of the study were used to assess VISA Stage I. 
 
 44
4. Performance Metrics 
The project group determined the following metrics were important, however, we 
did not verify these metrics with MSC or other clients:  
• What is the most likely amount of material delivered in a given time frame 
based on the current trade routes and schedules for the carriers under 
study? 
• What is the total material that can be delivered by VISA participants on a 
particular trade route? 
• What is the protection level that can be achieved for a given period of 
time? 
• What is the marginal benefit of adding an additional ship to a given route? 
• What is the marginal cost of losing one ship form a given route? 
• What is the most likely amount of material that can be delivered and what 
is corresponding protection level for a “risk contingency” scenario? 
5. Solution Methodology 
In order to perform an analysis that is suited for contingency and capacity 
planning, a model was developed. This model would not only be able to explore 
averages, but also be able to give more details about variability.  The model therefore 
includes, but is not limited to, things like failure rates, loading/unloading rates, harbor 
delay and sailing times that all are attached to a particular distribution.  The following 
was assumed in the model: uniform failure rates for the crane that loads the material, a 
triangular distribution for a route time and a uniform distribution for loading rates. These 
distributions are reasonable given the limited availability of data.  The uniform 
distribution enabled us to input a minimum and maximum value.  The triangular 
distribution also provided the option of having a most likely (mod) value.  
The model was also developed in such a way that it “reads in” data from text files.  
This was done purposefully to ensure that change to input data can be easily made 
outside the actual model and the user does not need to know anything about simulation 
software. 
6. System and Simulation Specification 
The VISA Program was not activated before and hence no lessons learned could 
be obtained.  It was only possible to ask questions about processes should the program be 
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activated, and to request data to support the model.  The project team was notified by a 
SDDC representative that some of the data could be obtained from the Internet e.g., the 
commercial shipping schedules.  This task proved difficult as all the information 
contained on the websites for APL and Maersk was provided in different formats and 
several hours were spent to consolidate the data into a useful form that could be used in 
the simulation. 
Upon further communication with the client, invaluable information was received.  
This provided the team with sufficient data as to the VISA ships and their corresponding 
attributes viz. name, vessels type, dry weight, fuel capacity, ship speed, square feet etc. 
(See Appendix D for this detail).  
According to Kelton (Ref. 96) the simulation specification should generally 
include the simulation objectives, system description and modeling approach, and 
animation exactness, modeling input and output, and project deliverables.  A functional 
specification was used as a guideline in drawing up the specification for this study. (Ref. 
97) 
7. Purpose of the Functional Specification 
The purpose of the functional specification is to streamline the development 
process of the simulation.  The functional specification is a transparent way of defining 
what is necessary to meet the user’s requirements. 
This functional specification firstly looks at the scheduling process, loading 
process, and the transportation process (ships sailing) from port of embarkation to port of 
debarkation and finally the return of the ship. 
Secondly, the user input required to perform the simulation analysis is defined.  
The input consists of things like ship capacity, speed, commercial shipping schedules and 
material requirements. 
Thirdly, the output generated by the simulation is defined.  These are defined in 
terms of performance quality metrics.  These include things such as total material 
delivered, transfer time and protection level achieved (percentage material delivered). 
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Finally the project deliverables are described; these include a CD ROM 
containing the Arena model and the final MBA Project report (this one). 
8. Use of the Model 
The model is designed to read in data from text files that can be easily changed 
based on different scenarios, and easily incorporate additional carriers and ships.  The 
user cannot change the ports of embarkation and debarkation as these are predefined.  
However the simulation model has been designed for future students or developers to 
very easily modify the ports of embarkation and debarkation.  The model furthermore 
needs very little user interface, aside from the input text files that is already populated 
with data.  The reason for this is to make the model as autonomous as possible and user 
friendly.  The user can also easily interpret the output but looking at an excel file instead 
of the built in reports that are generated by Arena that may be difficult to interpret. 
9. Hardware and Software Requirements  
Due to the complexity of the simulation, Arena 7.01 or higher version is 
necessary to perform any changes on the model.  The model would run on the student 
version of Arena but it cannot be modified as it exceeds the limitation of the student 
version.  The following hardware and software requirements are recommended to run 
Arena 7.01. (Ref. 98)   
• Microsoft Windows 95 or higher (OSR-2), Windows 98, Windows ME, 
NT 4.0 (Service Pack 5 or later), Windows 2000 or Windows XP. 
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.01 with Service Pack 2 or higher. 
• Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or later  
• 128 MB RAM recommended 
• Minimum Pentium processor, 300 MHz or higher 
• A 1024X786 monitor resolution or higher 
• Administrative privileges if using Windows NT, 2000 and XP. 
However, due to the complexity of the model, the team used a high-end computer 
in order to have a reasonable run time.  The computer used was a Pentium 4, 3.2 GHz 
processor with 512 MB of RAM.  To achieve the shortest run time, the model was set to a 
batch run with no animation, the excel output file (outputdata.xls) is closed and the model 
was run in fast forward. 
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10. System Description and Modeling Approach 
The “system” under study is not actually Stage 1 of the VISA Program.  Only 3 of 
the total of 48 carriers were modeled.  However, it is envisaged that all remaining (not 
modeled) carriers would behave in a similar manner, with the exception that their trade 
routes may be different. 
The model will include the loading of material at the harbor, the ship setting sail 
according to a given schedule, the ship sailing on its commercial trade route, the arrival 
and unloading at the disembarkation port and the return of the ship to its port of 
embarkation for more material.  
Finally all the material transported would be tracked over time to determine what 
protection level is achieved. 
11. Model Timeline 
The model starts off with the first ship available for the transportation of the 
military material that has already been delivered to the port of embarkation.  If there is no 
military material available then the model starts off loading potential material and 
simulates the amount of military material that is possible to be delivered in a given time 
frame.  
The model will be able to simulate the VISA transportation for a period of 
45(forty five) days.  This period can be adjusted depending on the user’s requirements.   
12. Ships 
The three types of ships that the model initially considered were RORO (Roll On 
Roll Off) ships, container ships and LASH (Lighter aboard ship).  The latter was however 
not being used to a high degree; hence it is not visible in the model.  However the 
capability is built in.  The removal of the LASH ship would not affect the VISA Program 
Stage I results. 
13. Loading at Harbor 
Variability was modeled at the harbor in two places. For example, the variability 
that relates to variance in loading from a variety of sources such as terrorism; worker 
strikes; go-slow protests; and landside congestion was modeled using a simple delay 
module that had a triangular distribution.  The user-input was the most likely delay noted.  
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As a result, the variance was calculated to be approximately 50 percent of the harbor 
delay time.  A uniform distribution was applied to the harbor rate.  Two types of harbors 
were considered for the model viz. a modern harbor and a traditional (old) harbor.  The 
reason these were included was that it may happen that a harbor, perhaps in a developing 
or third world country, does not have the latest and most efficient way of 
loading/unloading material.  Coupled to this was also the failure rate of the crane, the 
modern harbor had a failure rate that was much lower than the traditional harbor.  This 
was based on the premise that the traditional harbors had cranes that were suffering from 
ageing and material fatigue that resulted in the mean time between failures being shorter 
than for modern harbors. 
14. Ship Set Sail  
The ships set sail according to its commercial schedule that is determined by the 
carrier.  The trade routes and schedule that was provided by the carriers in their websites 
were used in the model.  A scheduled sailing was seen as a more realistic representation 
than a random sailing of ships, which does not happen in reality.  This may be different in 
Stage III when the MSP ships are activated and they do not operate according to a fixed 
schedule (which was the initial approach).  The activation of the MSP ships is however 
beyond the scope of this study. 
15. Animation Exactness 
The sailing of ships on its predefined commercial trade route from port of 
embarkation to debarkation and back is as exact as possible for modeling purposes.  At 
any given point in time the position of a ship can be determined by looking at its position 
on the world map.  This visual representation gives the user a more dynamic view of the 
VISA program instead of the model just running through logic like regular programming 
techniques.   
16. Model Input 
The following are the model input parameters.  These are read in via text files for 
ease of change outside Arena. 
a. Container Ship Input 
• Ship type 
• Container ship ID number 
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• Average container ship speed (in knots)  
• Average container ship capacity (in TEUs) 
• Route number 
• Ships per month  
b. RORO Ship Input 
• Ship type 
• RORO ship ID number 
• Average RORO ship speed (in knots)  
• Average RORO ship capacity (in square feet) 
• Route number 
• Ships per month  
c. Lash Ship Input 
• Ship type 
• Lash ship ID number 
• Average lash ship speed (in knots)  
• Average lash ship capacity (in number of barges) 
• Route number 
• Ships per month  
d. Harbor Input 
• Container military material (in TEUs), RORO military material (in square 
feet) and lash material (in total number of barges) at each harbor of 
embarkation. 
• Container loading rate (in containers per hour), RORO loading rate (in 
square feet per hour) and lash loading rate (in number of barges per hour) 
at all harbors. 
• Harbor index for all harbors 
• Distance to port of debarkation (in nautical miles) or time to port of 
debarkation (in days) from each port of embarkation 
• Delay time 





17. Output Data 
The output is “written to” an excel file for ease of statistical analysis and plotting 
of graphs.  Arena also produces its own output based on the simulation components 
however this is not discussed, because the system components are not analyzed.  The 
output of Arena is however attached in Appendix E.  It is attached for completeness and 
in the event that a developer of future student is interested. 
The following are the model output parameters for all harbors (detailed output): 
• Replication Number 
• Container, RORO and lash military material required for delivery (in 
TEUs, square feet and number of barges respectively) 
• Percentage container, RORO and lash military material delivered over 
time. 
• Container, RORO and lash material delivered (in TEUs, square feet and 
number of barges respectively) 
• Time taken for all military container, RORO and lash material to be 
delivered (in days) 
• An overall view of the total material delivered for each war scenario 
(Pacific material and Atlantic material) 
18. Project Deliverables 
Upon completion of this project a CD will be created to with all the computer 
files that are necessary to run the simulation on the full academic version of Arena.  The 
simulation is not offered as a commercial product and to be used for academic purposes 
only. 
 The files would include the following: 
• Arena file (3_carriers.doe) 
• Text files (read harbor info.txt, read container ship data.txt, read RO-RO 
ship data.txt, read lash ship data?) 
• Excel file (outputdata.xls), this file includes macros and visual basic code. 
19. Model Validation 
The model is a limited representation of the whole VISA Stage I program.  The 
focus of the model is thus only on US Flag carriers on the chosen routes.  For this 
purpose, the actual data from the commercial shipping websites (see Appendix F to J) 
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were used to determine the schedule of the ships.  All VISA carriers were looked at and a 
reasonable representation is made of the three major carriers (APL, Maersk and 
American RORO Carrier, LLC).  The model was validated by insuring that the 
commercial schedules were accurately reflected in the base scenario. 
B. DETAIL MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The model is hereafter is described in detail according to the named views in the 
model.  This is done for convenience as well to provide a means to directly cross 
reference to the model. 
1. The World Map View 
 
Figure 11.   World map view of simulation model showing commercial trade routes 
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Figure 12.   World map view showing Container, RORO and LASH ships on their 
trade route 
 
The world map view Figure 11 shows the commercial trades routes of the 3 
Carriers under study.  The trade route for the APL Mediterranean Gulf Service is from 
Houston (East CONUS) to Gioia (Italy) and back.  The trade route for the APL carrier 
Pacific South Service is from Los Angeles (West CONUS) to Singapore.  The trade route 
for the Maersk Trans Atlantic Service is form Norfolk (East CONUS) to Bremerhaven 
(Germany) and back; the American RORO Carrier used a similar route.  The trade routed 
for the Maersk Trans Pacific Service is from Oakland (West CONUS) to Kwangyang 
(Korea).  The importance of the world map view is to have a visual representation of the 
ships sailing.  Once the simulation runs the ships can be seen sailing through their various 
routes based on their given schedules.  This animation is consistent with the logic of the 
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simulation.  In other words if the route module states that the route time is 19 days the 
animated ship would set sail for 19 days.  These 19 days is represented in simulation time 
that is regular time accelerated.  If the model is stopped (paused) or interrupted, the 
simulated position of the ships can be seen.  A snapshot in time can therefore be taken 
and the model can resume the continuous sailing of ships for the defined run time 
(mission duration). 
The total number of each type of ship is shown at the bottom of the world map 
view.  Furthermore, each ship may undertake many trips.  Once the ships unload the 
material at the port of debarkation they return for more material based on the carriers 
schedule for that ship. 
2. The Harbor Info View 
 




Figure 13 shows a part of the Pacific trade route for the APL and the Maersk 
carriers.  The total military material available to be transported from each harbor, the 
material that left the harbor of embarkation (material shipped) and the material that 
arrived at the harbor of debarkation are shown.  The total number of ships that set sail 
from the harbor and those that reached the destination is also shown.  The ships capacity 
is shown and is determined as the maximum capacity of the ship multiplied by the 
maximum VISA percentage.  The maximum VISA capacity is shown and for Stage I this 
is 15% of a carrier’s total capacity.  It was assumed in the simulation that for the base 
scenario every ship of the carrier would allocate 15% of its capacity to the VISA 
program.  This does not necessarily have to be the case in reality as a carrier may choose 
to allocate 100% of a particular ship’s capacity to military material.  However this does 
not pose a problem as the model is only concerned with VISA capacity not capacity in 
general.  Also in reality, allocating 15% of each ship’s capacity does relatively minimum 
harm in terms of upsetting commercial trade. 
For this purpose, the model also simulates a “risk contingency” case scenario.  
Here the percentage of material loaded on each ship is a uniform distribution from 10 to 
15%.  The ship may leave with less than 15% material as the full complement of material 
may not be available at the harbor or some of the material may be damaged and not 
military useful.  This is still in keeping with the operation of Stage I of the VISA 
program. 
a. APL carrier Pacific South Service from Los Angeles (West 
CONUS) to Singapore: Container Material and Lash Material 
From the Figure 13 above it can be seen that there is no (0 TEUs) of 
container military material available for transport from Los Angeles.  The model provides 
us with an indication of the total material that would have been possible to transport 
during a given time period.  This is despite the fact that there was no planned or no 
military material available for transport.  This can aid in planning purposes.  In total 3045 
TEUs of potential container material were shipped from Los Angeles on the 5 ships but 
only 1827 have arrived at Singapore. This is because only 4 ships reached Singapore 
during the time period under consideration and there is one ship on the way carrying the 
remainder of the material.  
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The LASH material consisted of 70 barges for transport from Los Angeles 
to Singapore.  Only 2 LASH ships left the Los Angeles port and both arrived at 
Singapore.  The first LASH ship arrived with 60 barges and the second arrived with the 
remainder of the material (10 barges) even though the second ships capacity was 60 
barges. 
b. The Maersk Trans Pacific Service from Oakland (West CONUS) 
to Kwangyang (Korea): R-Ro Material   
Here it can be seen that there is 90000 sq ft of military RORO material to 
be transported.  The model shows that it was possible for 13500 sq ft of material to be 
shipped from Oakland, within the mission duration and assuming that VISA stage I was 
activated.  It is also shown that 3 RORO ships set sail with 2 RO-RO ships arriving at the 
destination with 9000 sq ft of material and the balance of 4500 sq ft still on its way. 
3. Pacific Routes Military Material View 
 
Figure 14.   Pacific Routes Military Material for the APL Pacific South Service 
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Figure 14 shows the port of embarkation (Los Angeles) with the military material 
(max inventory) that to be transported by the APL carrier.  The next row shows the 
balance of the material still to be shipped (material remaining #) and the percent shipped 
from the harbor.  As more and more material is loaded at the harbor the percent shipped 
increases up to a 100% and the box fills up “linearly” until completely filled with green 
when there is no more military material to be shipped.  As the model runs this view 
provides a visual representation of the material that is being shipped.  There is also a time 
delay due to the physical sailing of ships on their routes before the material arrives at the 
port of debarkation.  This can be seen once the model is running where the material 
delivered (material received #) is always lagging behind the material shipped. 
At the port of debarkation (Singapore) the material received is shown for all the 
types of ships.  Here, the material that is still on its way.  As more and more material is 
delivered the box fills up with more and more red color.  Each time material is delivered 
the time (received [days]) is also updated to reflect the corresponding time.  The time 
stops updating after 100% of the military material is delivered.  In fact only 33% of 
container material has been delivered within 40 days, even less for the RORO (9%) in 34 
days.  The lash ships showed 100% delivery after 36.66 days. 
It should be noted that the combination of material received % and time (received 
[days]) gives us the protection level achieved.  The percentage material delivered is 
continuously updated as more and more ships unload their material at the harbor of 
debarkation.  A snapshot in time can be taken by pausing/interrupting the run and this 
view would give the corresponding protection level.  A 100% protection level means that 
all military material is to be delivered.  If there are more ships that are available to set sail 
before the simulation run expires, these ships are not counted (in simulation terms they 
are disposed off); even the time stops being counted further until the end of the run.  The 
protection level in relation to time is extremely important to the combatant. 
The percent material shipped and received is only applicable if there is military 
material available for delivery.  Otherwise, the model ignores these fields.  The model 
can therefore do one of two things (for this situation).  It can either determine the time it 
takes to deliver the military material recorded in time [days] field or it can determine the 
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amount of material that can be practically delivered during the time chosen for the 
mission.  It is also worth mentioning that there may be less than 100% of the military 
material delivered, depending on the time period chosen to simulate the run.  This is very 
important during planning.  The total material delivered provides information about the 
maximum amount of military material that can be transported.  
4. Read Harbor Data View 
 
Figure 15.   Read Harbor data view of simulation model 
 
The read harbor data sub-model reads in the data for the military material to be 
transported by container, RORO or lash ships from each port of embarkation.  The read 
harbor data reads in data from a text file.  This read harbor data text file is shown in 
Appendix A. The data that is read in includes the military container, RORO and lash 
material at each harbor of embarkation as well as the associated load rates.  The harbor 
index as well as the distance or route time to port of debarkation is also read in. 
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The reason for reading in values was so that these values can be changed outside 
the model by anyone who knows little about simulation.  This facilitates input into the 
model by any user. The model cannot run without the text file as it is an integral part of 
the simulation. 
The read harbor data module reads in data line by line sequentially from the text 
file.  The lines with the $ sign are ignored by the read process as these lines refers to 
comments.  This is a useful feature and there are several comments that were included in 
the text file to make it more meaningful.  The comments also facilitated the entering of 
headings so as to name the record fields. 
This submodel also checks which type of scenario is to be simulated.  The model 
simulates the normal schedule first.  Once completed (based on the number of 
replications), the read harbor data module “switches over” to the “risk contingency” 
scenario 
5. Read Ship Data and Send Ship View 
 
Figure 16.   Read ship data and send container ship view 
 
Figure 16 shows the read ship data and send container ship view.  The data is read 
from a text file.  See Appendix A for this text file.  The data that is read includes: the 
container ship ID number, the container ship speed and capacity as well as the particular 
route for the container ship.  However, the data represents the average ship for the carrier 
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on a particular route.  The model could have just as well used specific ships with their 
speeds and capacities.  The reason for not doing so was firstly there was no major 
difference between the sizes, capacity and ship speed for the container ships on a 
particular route.  The average ship represented a “grey ship” that is more representative 
of the long-term situation rather than looking at specific ships.  The grey ship means that 
even though a carrier owns a particular ship, other carriers may charter that ship.  Please 
see Appendix E for raw data of the average ships.  The variability in ships capacity is an 
extension for future follow-on work. The carrier e.g. APL might decide based on their 
own discretion or due to their operational needs and maintenance requirements “pull off” 
a ship and replace it, then it is of no particular use to model each ship.  Furthermore, if 
the model were exploring MSP ships then each ship would be modeled and identified 
uniquely without the use of average ships. 
This submodel also determines for each type of scenario whether there is to be the 
normal (regular) number of ships or one more or one less ship if necessary.  There is also 
an embedded sub-sub model that creates only the necessary number of ships per month. 
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6. Model View 
 
Figure 17.   The model view showing sub-models 
 
Figure 17 above shows the model with part of all the sub-models.  The model was 
divided into sub-models based on functionality.  This was also important as the model is 
extremely complex and had to be broken down in management pieces.  The use of sub-
models was one way that facilitated the development process of the relatively complex 
model.  Once it was found the sub-model worked for a single carrier with a single route 
this was “duplicated” for more carriers with additional routes.  Starting from the top of 
Figure 17, the read ship data and send ship sub-model as well as the harbor data sub-
model was discussed.  The control sub-model and the sub-models for the port of origin 
and the routing shall be discussed in the sections that follow. 
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7. Houston Harbor View 
 
Figure 18.   Part of the Houston harbor view 
 
Here the ships load all the types of military material (container, RORO and lash).  
This is done at each harbor.  The ships are also loaded with either military material or 
regular commercial cargo.  The loading rate at each harbor depends on whether the 
harbor is modern or old.  A modern harbor has twice the loading/unloading rate of an old 
harbor.  The container loading rate variability is modeled as a uniform distribution with a 
minimum and maximum loading rate.  This was done so as to ensure that harbors that are 
not well equipped in terms of facilities and infrastructure could be accommodated.  The 
harbor at Singapore is a world-class harbor as Singapore serves as one of the hubs for 
South East Asia.  It is envisaged that other harbors around the world may not behave 
similarly, even in CONUS.  Once all the material is loaded, based on the VISA capacity 
i.e. 15% of each ships capacity, the ship is sent to the route module which routes the ship 
from the port of embarkation to the its port of debarkation.  This is shown in the next 
view below. 
It was mentioned earlier that the model does not look into the intermodal 
activities.  However it was also stated that a “black box” approach was used.  (See 
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Section A-2 for this discussion).  In other words a delay time was built in every harbor 
for the “risk contingency” scenario.  The delay time variability was modeled as a 
triangular distribution with ± 50% deviation from an envisaged most likely delay time.  
Also, the user may change the most likely delay time. 
This submodel also checks whether the normal case scenario or “risk 
contingency” scenario is being simulated and adjusts the necessary parameters.  In the 
normal case scenario, the ships capacity is fixed as a percentage of a given VISA stage.  
Under the “risk contingency” scenario the ships capacity is determined following a 
uniform distribution within the bounds of the VISA stage. 
8. The Routing Module View 
 
Figure 19.   Part of the routing sub-model: Mediterranean Gulf Service from Houston 
(East CONUS) to Gioia (Italy) and back 
 
At the harbor of debarkation the material is unloaded.  There is some variability 
built in here, as there may be some reason that delays the unloading of the material.  This 
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may be a result of the harbor being blocked by environmentalist, or lack of unloading 
crew due to labor strikes or other risk factors that is discussed in Chapter III.  As the 
material is unloaded it is counted and the results are written to an Excel file for the output 
analysis.  See Appendix K for the output excel file and Chapter V for the output analysis.  
Finally the ship then returns the port of origin to start the process again and re-load the 
material if there is still mission time available.  
This submodel also consolidates the individual harbors of debarkation based on 
whether the material is delivered to the Atlantic or the Pacific theatres 
9. Routing Time Determination View 
 
Figure 20.   Part of sub-model showing the decision to choose the routing time 
 
Here, in Figure 20, the model decides whether to use the route time that is 
provided by the carriers or if the route time is not provided a calculation is done to ensure 
to calculate the average route time based on the ship speed and the route distance. 
There is very little variability built in the sailing time for the regular schedule.  A 
triangular distribution of ± 12 hours from the scheduled route time or calculated route 
time is used in the model.  The reason for this relative small variability is that the carriers 
have already “built in” risk for the schedule sailing times and the probability of a ship not 
 64
arriving on time is very low.  This is in keeping with good business practices.  If a 
container ship, say is 4 days late, this would be extremely bad for future business for the 
carrier as commercial cargo is depending on the arrival of the goods for their sales.  For 
the “risk contingency” scenario, the route time is ± 48 hrs from the scheduled or 
calculated route time.  The reason for including such a wide variability was that it is 
envisaged that the VISA Program would be activated when there is some sort of 
disruption with the regular volunteer shipping.  This would affect the route time amongst 
other things. 
10. Output Data to File 
 
Figure 21.   Output data sub-model 
 
Here, in Figure 21, the model outputs all the data that is to be analyzed to an excel 
file.  The explanation of the output is shown in Section A-17 of this chapter and the Excel 
output is shown in Appendix K.  This submodel also writes the control replication length 
parameters to the excel file which is thereafter used by a visual basic program to analyze 
the data that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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V. OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
A. MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM OBSERVATIONS FOR TIME AND 
MATERIAL  
The Arena simulation program generates its own output based on the system 
components embedded in the model.  This output is useful for a manufacturing or service 
industry where the goals are inter alia process optimization, reducing wait/queue times 
and optimizing equipment utilization rates.  Analyzing the components of the system 
(model) is not as useful to the military user or combatant, who is more focused on 
outcomes, and their contingencies.   
It is for this reason that the necessary output variables were written to an excel file 
named output_data.xls.  A very short extract of the data from this file is shown in 
Appendix M.  The data from the aforementioned excel file was thereafter analyzed and 
put in a useful form.  This was done by one of several means that included writing 
macros, writing visual basic program codes and running crystal ball software. 
It is important for the combatant to have an overall view of the total material 
delivered at each theatre of war, as well as to have a timeline to work within.  The 
sections that follow therefore discuss these two important parameters viz. time and 
material.  The minimum and maximum observations for both time and material are 
discussed. In addition, each scenario was simulated (replicated) 100 different times. The 
minimum observation for time is equivalent to the earliest time a first ship offloads at the 
harbor of debarkation, across all 100 replications.  The maximum observation for time is 
equivalent to the latest time a last ship offloads at the harbor of debarkation, across all 
100 replications.  These minimum and maximum observations for time are performed for 
each scenario.   
The minimum observation for material is the least amount of material that is 
offloaded on a first delivery at the harbor of debarkation, across all 100 replications.  
That is, it is the smallest amount of material delivered by the first ship to reach the port of 
debarkation following invocation of VISA.  The maximum observation for material is 
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equivalent to the most amount of material that is offloaded at the harbor of debarkation. 
These minimum and maximum observations for material are performed for each scenario. 
The maximum observations for time and material are related in the following 
way.  The maximum material cannot be delivered later than the maximum time (it could 
have been delivered a little earlier).  This means that within scenarios there may be 
instances where some ships arrive a little later but the total material delivered is still 
lower than the maximum observation for material.  To summarize no ship arrives later at 
the harbor of debarkation or with more material than the observed maximum results. 
Similarly the minimum observation for time and material are related in the 
following way.  The minimum material cannot be delivered earlier than the minimum 
time  (it could have been delivered a little later).  This means that some of the earlier first 
ships that arrive may have delivered higher than the minimum material observed.  To 
summarize no ship arrives earlier at the harbor of debarkation or with less material than 
the observed minimum results. 
The material delivered to the two theatres will be known as the Pacific material 
and Atlantic material from now on.  The Pacific material consists of all the material that 
is delivered via transpacific routes. 
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Table 2.   Normal and Risk-Contingency Schedule: Pacific: Minimum and 
Maximum Observed Material and Time 
Normal Schedule 
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min       18.87 609.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max         41.82 3820.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Normal Schedule + 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min    18.98 609.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max    43.50 4775.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Normal Schedule - 1 (Minimum and Maximum material) 
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min    18.87 609.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max    39.08 2865.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
Risk-Contingency Schedule  
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min       19.99 235.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max    44.99 3464.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
“Risk Contingency” + 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min    19.59 232.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max    45.00 3862.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
“Risk Contingency” - 1 (Minimum and Maximum material) 
Time (Days) Cont Time 
RO-
RO Time Lash 
Min    20.23 232.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max    44.97 2656.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
 
Table 2 above shows the maximum and minimum observation for material 
delivered and the maximum and minimum observation for time. In addition, the 
maximum observation for material is also equivalent to an objective that is rarely 
achieved. However it has some positive probability given the system constraints 
(simulation of the real case taking into account the variable amount of material loaded, 
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the variable route time, the variable loading and unloading rates as well as any associated 
delays).   
For illustration purposes only, graphs were plotted that drew a straight line 
through two points.  The first point was the combination of minimum observations of 
material and time.  The second point was the combination of maximum observations of 
material and time.  These graphs are discussed in the figures below.  In order to be clear 
that the output not only gives two points, a random pick of one actual simulation result is 
also plotted on the same set of axes. This is seen as the simulated schedule line. 
1. Scheduled Pacific Material: Container 
Figure 22 shows the container maximum observation for material delivered using 
the normal (regular) commercial schedule.  The material includes the totals of all the 
material delivered to both Singapore and Kwangyang harbors.  The detail view at each 
harbor is also available in the excel_output.xls file and hence it is not attached.  It is 
generally more useful to look at the overall picture shown in Figure 22, but if there is a 
problem with the overall picture, e.g. if the material that was delivered was not meeting 
the requirements, then one can look deeper into the detail view. 
It can be seen from Figure 22 that the minimum observed container of 609 TEUs 
arrived at the Pacific theatre.  The minimum observed time was 18.87 days.  This 
represents the shortest possible time to get material across for this scenario.  The 
maximum observed time for delivery was 41.82 days.  The figure also shows what would 
happen to the results if one additional ship were made available on the route.   
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Schedule Schedule + 1 Schedule - 1 Simulated schedule
 
Figure 22.   Scheduled container Pacific material 
 
Figure 22 above shows that there is indeed a significant difference in the amount 
of material that is delivered for the different scenarios.  The maximum observed material 
that is delivered under the regular (normal) schedule is 3820 TEUs. This occurs not later 
than the maximum observed time of 41.82 days.  However, when one additional ship is 
made available the amount of maximum observed material delivered increases to 4775 
TEUs, and is delivered no later than the maximum observed time of 43.50 days.  This is a 
net benefit of 955 TEUs in maximum material.  The maximum observed time is only 1.68 
days more for the final delivery.  This is still within the mission duration of 45 days.  One 
can allocate a cost of the additional ship and similarly a cost benefit analysis can be 
performed to determine whether the additional ship is cost effective based on this 
marginal benefit for the observed maximum material. This cost benefit analysis falls 
outside the scope of this study and is an extension for future work.  However, the project 
group also intends to develop the concept of a marginal risk reduction, which provides 
additional information beyond that of the marginal benefit for the observed maximum 
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material.  This marginal risk reduction might also be examined from a cost/benefit 
perspective, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this report.   
2. Risk Contingency Pacific Material: Container 
Figure 23 below shows the case when there is some disruption to the normal 
scheduled case.  This is a result of a combination in variability in the material loaded i.e. 
not being a constant 15% but rather some random number between 10 and 15 % based on 
a uniform distribution.  There is also additional variability that is built in at each harbor 
that includes a delay modeled as a triangular distribution.  This is applies a “black box” 
approach to all problems associated with intermodal activities, slowdowns, landside 
congestion, terrorist activities, labor strikes and other activities.  Finally, there is a higher 
risk of each ship not being on time.  This is represented by the greater spread in the 
triangular distribution for the route time.  This spread is under the normal schedule ±12 
hours from the specified or calculated route time whereas for the “risk contingency” 
scenario it is ±48 hours from the route time. 
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Figure 23.   Risk Contingency Container: Pacific material 
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From Figure 23 above it can be seen that the “risk contingency” material results in 
overall less material being transported.  The maximum observed material delivered was 
3464 TEUs compared to maximum observed material of 3820 TEUs for the normal 
schedule scenario.  Also the marginal benefit of adding an additional ship on the route is 
398 TEUs of material, based on the maximum observations.  It is most interesting to note 
that the last ship delivered its material at exactly 45 days, which is just in the nick on 
time.  The marginal cost of losing a ship is 808 TEUs, again based on the maximum 
observations for material. 
3. Scheduled Pacific Material: RORO 
No RORO material was scheduled for the delivery to the Pacific theatre.  This is 
because the RORO ship that is simulated only delivers to the Atlantic theatre, which will 
be discussed a little later. 
4. Risk contingency Pacific Material: RORO 
Since there is no scheduled material there is no “risk contingency” scenario. 
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Table 3.   Normal and Risk contingency: Atlantic Minimum and Maximum 
Observed Material 
Normal Schedule (Minimum and Maximum material) 
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    12.97 498.00 14.39 25708.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    36.60 3376.00 36.39 80000.00 0.00 0.00   
              
Normal Schedule + 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    12.93 498.00 14.46 25708.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    38.32 4220.00 32.43 80000.00 0.00 0.00   
              
Normal Schedule - 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    12.92 498.00 14.47 25708.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    33.85 2532.00 44.65 80000.00 0.00 0.00   
              
              
“Risk Contingency” (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    14.42 235.00 16.20 17267.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    44.70 3015.00 43.22 79999.00 0.00 0.00   
              
“Risk Contingency” + 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    13.93 235.00 16.32 17228.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    44.89 3832.00 38.61 79999.00 0.00 0.00   
              
“Risk Contingency” - 1 (Minimum and Maximum material)  
Time (Days) Cont Time RO-RO Time Lash   
Min    14.47 249.00 15.68 17322.00 0.00 0.00   
Max    42.15 2317.00 40.57 75042.00 0.00 0.00   
              
 
5. Scheduled Atlantic Material: Container 
The Figure 24 below shows that the earliest the first ship arrives is 12.97 days 
(minimum observed time).  This ship and delivers at least 498 TEUs of material 
(minimum observed material).  The last ship (maximum observed time) arrives at 36.60 
days and maximum observed material that is delivered under the regular schedule is 3376 
TEUs, and when one ship is added the maximum observed material delivered increases to 
4220 TEUs, and is now delivered within 38.32 days (maximum observed time).  This is a 
marginal benefit of 844 TEUs based on maximum observed material with only 1.72 days 
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more time for the final delivery (based on maximum observed time).  This is well within 
the mission time of 45 days.  In the case of the normal schedule there are 8.4 days 
remaining in the mission time after the last amount of material is delivered. However, this 
does not mean that there is nothing happening during this time, in fact there are ships that 
are still on their way.  The ships still on sail can be seen from the harbor info view Figure 
13.  This view would give further insight into the material still on sail for the 
Bremerhaven and the Gioia harbors, which are the harbors under consideration for the 
Atlantic theatre. 
 


























Schedule Schedule + 1 Schedule - 1 Simulated schedule
 
Figure 24.   Scheduled Container Atlantic Material 
 
6. Risk Contingency Atlantic Material: Container 
It can be seen, from Figure 25 below, that the least amount of material that was 
delivered by the first ship was (235 TEUs) (minimum observed material).  This occurs no 
earlier than 14.42 days (minimum observed time) for the risk contingency schedule 
scenario. The maximum observed material delivered for the risk contingency scenario is 
3015 TEUs as compared to 3376 TEUs for the normal schedule scenario. Therefore, the 
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marginal benefit of adding one more ship on the route is 817 TEUs.  Furthermore, all the 
ships arrive just in time and with little time to spare (11 % of one whole day left (2.64 
hrs) for the “risk contingency” + 1 ship scenario).  On the other hand, the marginal cost 
of losing a ship is 302 TEUs. 
 


























Worse Worse + 1 Worse - 1 Simulated worse
 
Figure 25.   Risk Contingency Container Atlantic Material 
  
7. Scheduled Atlantic Material: RORO 
Figure 26 below shows the maximum observed scheduled material that can be 
delivered using RORO ships.  Here there is no difference between the scenarios of the 
regular number of ships and one more or one less ship in terms of maximum possible 
material delivered.  The reason for the not so significant benefit for one more ship is that 
the current number of ships is extremely low; in fact there is only 1 ship that set sails per 
week for the regular schedule.  Adding another ship effectively decreases the observed 
maximum time for the delivery from 36.39 days to 32.43 days a net benefit of 3.96 days.  
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There is also a “hidden” benefit that cannot be seen here but may be seen from the harbor 
info view Figure 13.  However this was unfortunately not captured to report here but 
logic states that there is material on its way that is a very short while away from delivery.  
Losing one ship increases the maximum observed time for delivery of 80000 sq ft of 
material to 44.65 days.  The final delivery takes 8.26days longer than the normal 
schedule and just about makes it for delivery before the mission time expires. 
The random pick of the simulated run is mostly outside the bounds of the lines 
plotted.  This is true, for all points except for the start point from where the simulated 
graph is plotted to the end point, which are always within the maximum and minimum 
observations. 
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Schedule -1 Roro Simulated schedule
 
Figure 26.   Scheduled Atlantic Material: RORO 
 
8. Risk Contingency Atlantic Material: RORO 
The Figure 27 below shows that the marginal benefit is not very significant for 
adding one more ship in the “risk contingency” material case.  There is no benefit visible 
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in material delivered but there is a benefit of 5.1 days.  The marginal cost of losing one 
ship from the route is 4957 sq ft. less material delivered.  
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Figure 27.   Risk contingency Atlantic Material: RORO 
  
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT 
This statistical analysis looks at the “risk contingency” scenarios already 
discussed in the preceding section.  To reiterate the previous section looks at maximum 
and minimum observed material and observed time.  Here there is no time parameter that 
is investigated, only the material is investigated.  Furthermore, instead of the maximum 
and minimum observed material, the 5th percentile and 95th percentile of total material 
delivered were also studied.  Furthermore, the same raw data that was used in Section A 
(not shown) is used in this analysis as well. 
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In order for the output to be utilized for contingency planning by a pragmatic 
combatant whose major focus is on risk, it is very important to provide information that is 
statistically sound.  
The points of interest for the combatant were chosen as the 5th and 95th percentile.  
This means that 90% of the time the total material delivered fell in the range between the 
5th and 95th percentile.  Three methods that may be used to determine the 5th and 95th 
percentile are elucidated below. 
1. Method I:  Direct from Sample Data 
The sample output data that consists of the total material delivered for all 100 
replications were arranged in ascending order.  The 5th and 95th data point for each 
scenario was thereafter selected and these observed data points represent the 5th and 95th 
percentiles.  This method however does not tell us much about the confidence of the 
estimates.  The results of this observed 5th and 95th percentile are reported in Table 4 
below. 
2. Method II:  Fit an Analytical Distribution to the Data 
If it is assumed that there is an underlying analytical distribution that fits the data 
then one can read off the 5th and 95th percentile from the analytical distribution.  This is 
shown below for the risk contingency Atlantic container total material. 
To facilitate this analysis the Crystal Ball® software which is an “add-in” to 
Excel® was used to fit an analytical distribution to the sample output data (total material 
delivered).  Figure 28 shows that the 5th and 95th percentiles are 2584 and 2972 TEUs 
respectively.  This is based on the Weibull distribution that was the best fit to the sample 
data according to the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit test reported by Crystal Ball.  The 
goodness of fit test statistic revealed that the analytical distribution did not fit the data 
well; however these results are reported below to show the concept only.  
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Atlantic Material     
Assumption:  Risk Contingency 
Container    
        
 
 Weibull distribution with 
parameters:  
  5% - tile 2584.43  
  50% - tile 2788.98  
  95% - tile 2972.24  
      
 
Selected range is from 2341.17 
to +Infinity  
        
        
 
Figure 28.   Risk contingency Atlantic Container Material: Weibull Distribution with 
5, 50 and 90 percentile 
 
3. Method III: The Bootstrap Method 
The Bootstrap method is a more systematic way of determining the 5th and 95th 
percentile.  Bootstrapping is a way to estimate parameters from a sample.  This is a more 
involved process and the full description of the method falls outside the scope of the 
study.  The Bootstrap however allows one to get a confidence interval around the 
estimate.  Please see Efron (Ref. 99) for an explanation of how the confidence intervals 
of a Bootstrap may be calculated.  The Bootstrap analysis for the simulation sample 
output for each scenario is reported in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4.   Observed Bootstrap Estimate and Confidence Interval for 5th and 95th 
Percentile 














Atlantic 2565 2569 2548 2580 2979 2977 2961 2979 
Plus One 3288 3292 3287 3301 3706 3702 3674 3748 
Minus One 1978 1984 1968 2008 2278 2271 2262 2280 
Pacific 2206 2198 2138 2215 3319 3298 3194 3332 
Plus One 2945 2946 2921 2955 3728 3728 3706 3770 
Minus One 1876 1905 1867 1928 2599 2582 2542 2601 
         
Mean = 2785.11
2341.17 2526.77 2712.37 2897.97 3083.56
Worse Container
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The 5th and 95th percentiles for the best distribution fit using the Bootstrap method 
are reported above in Table 4. This means that, across simulation runs, 90% of the time 
the estimated total delivery of material would fall somewhere in between these values.  
This gives the combatant more information to work with.  In addition, the 5th percentile 
was chosen because it was assumed that the combatant was prepared to accept a 5% level 
of risk.  There is also a 90% confidence interval that is built around both the 5th and 95th 
percentile so as not to report just a point estimate like the previous two methods.  This 
confidence interval is especially important for contingencies were the level of acceptable 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANALYSIS 
At the time of the simulation analysis for this project, 126 vessels comprised the 
VISA program.  In this regard, the initial undertaking was to identify what vessel routes 
were available for VISA carriers.  In the end, approximately 22 percent of the VISA 
capacity that was useful to the simulation was identified. Moreover, there was no attempt 
to encode every ship that was identified as belonging to the VISA program.  Only 
container and RO/RO ships participating in the VISA program were considered.  In other 
words, the type of vessels used in the model was restricted to U.S.-flag container and 
RO/RO ships on a given commercial route.  Additionally, the estimates derived for the 
output analysis in Chapter V did not include all VISA ships, but are listed in Appendix D 
and could be incorporated in future extension work.  This would be in keeping with the 
original scope of the project, which was to provide a tool that demonstrated proof of 
concept.  To this end, the brief analysis that follows is provided as answers to the 
research questions outlined in the introductory paragraph:    
1. What is the Material that Is Possible to Be Transported During Stage 
1 Of VISA Activation Using the Normal Commercial Trade Routes 
and Schedules?  
This question could not be answered because of data constraints.  Specifically, the 
unclassified nature of the project prevented the inclusion of current, relevant and accurate 
data contained in the various Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-Up Review 
documents.       
2. What is the Marginal Benefit of Adding One More Ship to the 
Existing the Commercial Trade Route and Similarly What Is the 
Marginal Cost of Losing One Ship from the Trade Route?   
Marginal benefit within the context of VISA/sealift asks what the value of an 
additional ship is.  In general terms, the amount of material that can be delivered under 
given risk conditions would decrease with the addition of one ship.  This would be 
analogous to a probability distribution where the addition of a ship represented a shift in 
the curve that indicated the following: 
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• All things being equal (ceteris paribus); in a given time frame more 
material can be delivered on average, and any given amount of material 
can be delivered with less risk. 
• Given the same level of risk, more materiel can be delivered in the same 
time frame.   
• Given the same level of risk, the same materiel can be delivered in a 
shorter time frame.   
3. What Amount of Material Can Be Transported, Given a Specific 
Vessel Capacity and Assuming a “Risk Contingency” Scenario in a 
Given Timeframe?  
Any “risk contingency” scenario will depend on the level of variability caused by 
simulated risk events.  In other words, as the likelihood of risk events capable of 
impacting shipping increases; the variability also increases.  The output analysis 
produced in this simulation project showed that the addition of risk as seen in the 5th 
percentile and 95th percentile analysis of Chapter V decreased the amount of materiel that 
could be transported.     
As already noted, the classified nature of the data in the various Mobility 
Requirements Study documents prevented an accurate analysis of actual conditions.  
Hence the generalization of these specific numbers to actual two-theater scenarios is not 
possible.  However, there is no reason why the relative (percentage) reduction in average 
material delivered from the base case to the risk-contingency case should not represent a 
plausible estimate of the average (percentage) mission degradation from the risk factors 
modeled.   
4. What Are the Risks Involved after Activation of the VISA Program?  
In addressing the risk events that may occur after VISA is activated, scenarios 
such as unforeseen labor disputes; ship mechanical failures; shortfalls in U.S. mariner 
numbers and experience gaps can all impact the execution of DOD sealift requirements.  
Chapter three outlined a more detailed discussion of risk-related events and scenarios that 
are relevant to VISA. The primary findings relevant to risk are discussed in more detail in 
Section B of this chapter.  
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5. How Will These Risks Impact the DOD Sealift Capability i.e. the 
Time it Takes to Deliver the Materiel? 
Although the statistical analysis of the time is not performed in this study, the 
final material that is delivered during a chosen time frame is analyzed.  Considering that 
the occurrence of risk events would effectively lengthen unit materiel and equipment 
transportation times; one can conclude that DOD sealift capability would be degraded 
under these circumstances. 
B. RISK ASSESSMENT IN VISA 
1. Risk 
Risk was defined as any uncertainty that affects systems in an unknown manner 
whereby its consequences are also unknown. Furthermore, risk is seen as the probability 
of something bad happening. Therefore, to deal with the potential risk, companies began 
employing risk management and risk assessment methods to help mitigate the risk. 
Insurance companies were the first to use risk management and soon other areas of 
business followed suit. In the insurance industry, risk management was used to offer 
viable economic reasons for firm managers to encourage them to engage themselves with 
both expected profit and distribution of firm returns.  
2. Risk Management in Logistics and Mobility 
The purpose of risk management in logistics and mobility is to mitigate the risks 
associated with the transportation of military cargo. The risk associated with the 
transportation of military cargo is the probability of the material not arriving on time. The 
consequence of this risk would be a loss of competitive advantage on the battlefield for 
the U.S. and hence loss of life. This is a risk the U.S. is not willing to take. Therefore, to 
mitigate this risk, USTRANSCOM aims to decrease the probability that the material will 
not reach its destination timely. However, to mitigate this risk, risk assessment was 
conducted to identify and then analyze the risk. 
3. Risk Assessment in VISA 
This study concentrated on the risks associated with the VISA program, in 
particular after activation of the programs. For the purpose of this study, the risk 
assessment in VISA process was simplified into three stages viz. loading at CONUS, 
sailing of the ship, and then unloading at the transfer port. These stages were then 
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classified as risk events. Thereafter, the authors brainstormed various risks associated 
with the risk events. The identified risk were then analyzed and given risk ratings based 
on their probability and consequences. The identified risks were given probability 
distributions and thereafter used as input for the Arena simulation model. However, not 
all risk elements were included in the model assumptions.  For example, balking was 
discussed in Chapter II, but was excluded from the simulation analysis.  Despite the 
foregoing comments on risk, it is worth mentioning that the probability that VISA will be 
activated is remote.  
Risk was defined and discussed in detail in Chapter III.  For example, harbor 
blockades, arrival delays, in-country riots, labor disputes and slowdowns, port 
congestion, terrorist activities, ship mechanical failure and intermodal-related problems 
are probable risk-oriented events that could occur and reduce DOD’s overall sealift 
capability.  However, the likelihood of experiencing a combination of these events is 
remote or extremely low.  This conclusion is supported by “risk contingency” 
considerations – delay time and failure rates that were incorporated into the simulation 
model inputs.  Specifically, the variable nature of delay time, failure rates, and ship 
capacity under “risk contingency” conditions are representative of variability.  These 
input events were modeled in the project simulation to simulate risk and create a 
distribution. However, because the “risk contingency” scenario described in the foregoing 
paragraph is the likelihood of occurrence of these inputs; then it can be said that this 
probability would be very remote.  It therefore, can be said that a risk contingency 
scenario would also be a remote probability. In this regard, the conclusion that can be 
reached is that the likelihood of a real-world scenario that is close to a simulated risk 
contingency condition is very small.  This analogous to the point made previously, where 
the actual risk in regard to transportation capacity is small and the statement that an 
activation of the VISA program is marginal. 
C. EXTENSIONS 
In conclusion, several additional points bear mentioning.  First, considering the 
level of planning and coordination that takes place among representatives from DOD 
(USTRANSCOM), MARAD and the commercial carrier industry; what is the likelihood 
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that VISA would be activated during a two major theater war scenario?  Based on the 
research conducted for this project and the results of the simulation model, the probability 
of activation in the event of a Desert Shield/Desert Storm level contingency seems 
remote.  This assertion can be made because VISA activation in Stage I would coincide 
with the strongest elements of DOD’s organic mobility assets and capability.  In other 
words, during the initial stage of a contingency the lift assets that are likely to be 
employed to transport troops, Army brigade sets and high-demand military equipment to 
the operational theater will come from organic airlift, prepositioned LMSR vessels and 
host-nation prepositioned stocks as applicable.  In the event that organic military capacity 
was insufficient to meet the needs of war-fighters, the response by military planners and 
MSC logisticians would be to use ships of the FSS variety along with mobilization of the 
RRF.  The next logical step would be the solicitation and charter of U.S.-flag and foreign 
flag volunteers to fill any DOD capacity shortfall.  It is only after these sealift assets are 
totally exhausted that VISA can conceivably be activated.  In fact, there is an 
intermediate step on the path towards activation of VISA; the NDRF that are under the 
custody of MARAD and have an activation window that ranges between 20 and 120 
days.  Second, the communication and coordination achieved through JPAG decision 
forums provides timely and relevant information to all stakeholders involved with the 
VISA process.  This serves to reduce the inherent risks that may trigger VISA activation.  
Again, the likelihood of VISA activation is low considering the availability or adequacy 
of commercial U.S.-flag, foreign flag and effectively U.S.-controlled (EUSC) vessels.  A 
1997 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study reached a similar conclusion by 
asserting that adequate capacity was available in the commercial market to deliver 
sustainment materiel. (Ref. 100)  
In this regard, the key benefits that VISA offers DOD may not be access to 
capacity; but the advantages that are achieved through joint planning; the access to the 
modern and global intermodal infrastructure of commercial carriers; the risk reduction 
benefits or assuredness that is achieved by retaining a U.S.-flag merchant marine 
capability; retaining of the U.S. citizen mariner pool with the experience and relevant 
skill sets to function in a contingency environment. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The value of the simulation modeling undertaken in this project could have been 
maximized with the inclusion of cost benefit analysis to prove the usefulness of the VISA 
program.  However, this option was beyond the scope of this project because most of the 
data required to make definitive conclusions was classified.  To this end, future thesis 
research to assess the value of VISA should be undertaken in a classified realm.  For 
example, data related to the number of Army divisions and the capacity they represent 
can be extracted from the current Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review to 




APPENDIX A: HARBOR DATA TEXT FILE 
$This file contains the routes / harbor data  




$ Amount to be moved via container ship, RORO, and LASH and max capacity from 
each port if available and of interest 
$ If no data for military material (cont / roro / lash) is available type "0"!! 
$ 
$ Ports of embarkation and debarkation / routes 
$    
$ Cont / cont per hr / RORO (sqft) / roro per hr / LASH (# of barges) / barg per hr / 
harbor index / distance  / days / delay_time / route 
$ 
$ Route APL MGS (Route 1) 
 0 240 0 4000 0 2 1 4500 15 48 1
 $Houston / USA  port e1 
 0 200 0 4000 0 2 2 4500 18 96 1 $Gioia 
Tauri / Italy port de1 
$ 
$ Route APL PS1 (Route 2) 
 0 240 0 3000 0 3 3 6000 19 48 2 $Los 
Angeles / USA port e2 
 0 500 0  3000 0  4 4 5000 19 96 2
 $Singapure   port de2 
$ 
$ Route Maersk TA 2 (Route 3) 
 0 240 0 2500 0 2 5 0 13 48 1
 $Norfolk /USA  port e3 
 0 300 0 3000 0 1 6 0 22 72 1
 $Bremerhaven / GER port de3 
$ 
$ Route Maersk TP2 (Route 4) 
 0 240 0 2500 0 2 7 0 20 48 2
 $Oakland / USA port e4 
 0 300 0 2500 0 2 8 0 14 96 2
 $Kwangyang / Korea port de4 
$ 
$ Route American RoRo Carriers (route 5) 
  0 240 0 3000 0 2 9 0 14 48 1
 $Charleston / USA port e5 
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  0 0 0 3000 0 2 10 0 14 72 1
 $Bremerhaven 
$ 
$ number of general data to be read 
$ general data / variables: 
$ 
$  visa / ship plus per month / ship minus per month / delay time plus [%] 
$ 
 15  1   1  50 
$ 
$ 
$ Visa Stage in % (e.g. 15 % = 15) 
$ 
$ ship plus  (internal days will be subtracted from normal schedule time) => more ships 
on route per time frame means shorter schedule time (every 5 days instead 7 days a ship 
sail) input as ships per month!! 
$ 
$ ship minus  (internal days will be added to normal schedule time) => more ship on 
route per time frame; input as ships per month 
$ 
$ distance in nautical miles means distance to next harbor on route (normal route is a 
circle with two harbors) 
$   THIS IS NOT THE real world of carrier practice but a approximation we used. 
$ 
$ days means sailing-days to the next harbor on that route (normally to harbor of 
debarkation and back to harbor of embarkation. 
$ 
$ delay_time means possible delay in front of harbor entry due to different reasons (no 
loading / unloading facility available or closed harbor and others); input in hours 
$ 
$ harbor index is given by Arena intern in sequence of reading the harbor data!! 
$ 
$ delay time plus [input in %] is used to set up the max point for the delay module in 
front of each harbor; equal for each harbor; however, because delay time * delay time 
plus % = max delay for TRIA distribution each harbor is unique 
$ 
$ route info for counting Atlantic and pacific total route material 1=Atlantic / 2=pacific 
$  END 
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APPENDIX B: CONTAINER SHIP DATA TEXT FILE 
$  input file for container ship data 
$ 




$ container ship data 
$ 
$ ship type / container ship ID number  /  container ship speed  /  container ship capacity / 
Route / ship per month 
$ 
 1 1 20.7 2306 1 4.28 $ avg ship APL MGS 




 1 4 20 3320 3 4.28 $ avg ship Maersk TA2 
 1 3 20.7 2306 4 4.28 $ avg ship Maersk TP2 
$ 
$ 
$ route means the specific route on which the ship is used through the carrier 
$ 
$ 1 = APL Mediterranean Gulf Service (MGS) 
$ 2 = APL Pacific South 1 Service (PS1) 
$ 3 = Maersk Transatlantic (TA2) 
$ 4 = Maersk Transpacific II (TP2) 
$ 
$ ships per month is intern handled as schedule time is: ship sails every "x" days; e.g. 
every 7 days one ship 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91
APPENDIX C: RO-RO SHIP DATA TEXT FILE 
$  input file for roro ship data 




$  roro ships data (capacity in sqft) 
$ 
$ ship type / roro ship id  /  roro ship speed  /  roro ship capacity  /  route / ships per 
month 
$ 
$ 2 1 19 30000  1 2 
$ 2 2 19 40000  2 2 
$ 2 3 19 160000 3 4.28 
$ 2 4 19 30000  4 4.28 
  2 5 18 171385 5 4.28 
$ 
$ route means the specific route on which the ship is used through the carrier 
$ 
$ 1 = APL Atlantic MGS - port of origin is Houston 
$ 2 = APL pacific PS1 - port of origin is Los Angeles 
$ 3 = Maersk Transatlantic (TA2) and American RoRo Carrier 
$ 4 = Maersk Transpacific II (TP2) 
$ 5 = American RoRo Carrier Inc Atlantic route 
$ 
$ ships per month is intern handled as schedule time is: ship sails every "x" days; e.g. 
every 7 days one ship 
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APPENDIX D: THE VISA SHIP DATA 
 
                       VOLUNTARY INTERMODAL SEALIFT AGREEMENT DRY CARGO VESSELS          
                        
                   
                                              WITH BASIC VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS/1          
             BY TYPE AND NAME           
                   








DWT FUEL FUEL TEUS TEUS BALE MEAS 
NUMBER    /2  TYPE        CAP CONS  MT/3  TONS 
  V M J               
  S S A               
  A P                
******** ********************************* ******* ********** ******* ******* ***** ****** ****** ****** ******** ****** ****** ****** ********* ******** *********
7515339 ADVANTAGE  Y   BB/5 M44905  17.5 170 26.4 11.5 27740 1885 43 726 16582   30603 
6916873 CLEVELAND Y   BB M31055  21 184.4 24.99 10.67 22210 1680 85 332 7583   26195 
9010498 COASTAL NAVIGATOR/10 Y  Y BB N53755  12 59 12.6 5.5 1406 759 8    35000 
5408491 COASTAL TRADER/10 Y  Y BB M32482  10.5 78.34 13.42 4.04 2235 398 6.5    56000 
7529914 NOBLE STAR Y   BB M47479  17.5 171.41 25.4 10.55 27135 2900 43 660 15074   27135 
6909911 WILSON Y   BB M30603  21 184.4 24.99 10.67 22210 1680 85 332 7583  26195 
                   
 TOTAL BREAKBULK VESSELS    6              
                   
7821154 CYNTHIA FAGAN/6 Y   BULK M56876 43000 16.75 186.49 28.35 10.75 36414 2802 37    40095 
7225855 JUDY LITRICO Y  Y BULK M37952 34000 14 158.38 23.47 9.75 30463 2737 33     
9278753 LIBERTY EAGLE Y   BULK M95546 30000 15.3 189.99 32.26 12.25 50600 2467 38     
9228136 LIBERTY GLORY Y   BULK N94733 30000 15.3 189.99 32.26 11.92 50601 2467 38     
9228148 LIBERTY GRACE Y   BULK N94734 30000 15.3 189.99 32.26 11.92 50601 2467 38     
8300901 LIBERTY SEA Y   BULK M62383 57000 15 225 32.2 13.12 63739 2939 33     
8500549 LIBERTY SPIRIT Y   BULK M01139 57000 15.8 225.03 32.31 13.11 64152 2939 45     
8510647 LIBERTY STAR Y   BULK M02888 57000 17 225 32.21 13.1 64152 1570 34     
8500551 LIBERTY SUN Y   BULK M02893 57000 17 225 32.26 13.1 64059 2120 34     
8311089 LIBERTY WAVE Y   BULK M62779 57000 15 225 32.2 13.12 63463 2507 34     
7929308 SHEILA MCDEVITT Y  Y BULK M56601 43000 15 187.74 28.4 10.76 37244 2887 36     
                   
 TOTAL BULK CARRIERS    11              
                   
9074389 APL CHINA Y Y  CNTNR N61937  24.5 276.3 40 14 66630 6688 183 3900 89076   
9074535 APL KOREA Y Y  CNTNR N61950  24.5 276.3 40 14 66630 6688 183 3900 89076   
9077276 APL PHILIPPINES Y Y  CNTNR N62416  24.5 276.3 40 14 66630 6688 183 3900 89076   
9074547 APL SINGAPORE Y Y  CNTNR N61951  24.5 276.3 40 14 66630 6688 183 3900 89076   
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9077123 APL THAILAND Y Y  CNTNR N62401  24.5 276.3 40 14 66630 6688 183 3900 89076   
7635933 ARGONAUT Y   CNTNR M52638  20 185.92 23.77 8.23 16205 2299 250 1086 24804   
8912857 ASCENSION/10 Y   CNTNR N51974  12.5 97.8 17.3 5.62 4124 90 12 270 6167   
8200711 CHESAPEAKE BAY Y Y  CNTNR M00010  18 206 32.21 11.5 36004 4082 163 2409 55022   
7114185 CHIEF GADAO Y  Y CNTNR M35121  21.3 240.09 30.48 10.67 37346 9272 138 1981 45246   
7119678 COASTAL VENTURE/10 Y  Y CNTNR M35754  13 71.81 12.91 3.499 1390 166 5.5 82 1873    
8200709 DELAWARE BAY Y Y  CNTNR M64888  18 206 32.21 11.5 36004 4082 163 2409 55022   
9007817 ENDEAVOR Y Y  CNTNR N53506  18 181.44 31.4 10.3 35012 2284 53 1834 41889   
9007829 ENDURANCE Y Y  CNTNR N53507  18 181.4 31.4 10.3 35012 2629 53 1834 41889   
9007831 ENTERPRISE Y Y  CNTNR N53508  18 181.4 31.4 10.3 35012 2629 53 1834 41889   
7125316 EWA Y  Y CNTNR M35880  21 249.92 30.48 10.67 38656 9272 138 2015 46023   
7710733 GEYSIR/10 Y   CNTNR M56200  13.75 90.07 13.72 4.53 2786 241 9 141 3220   
8419142 HORIZON ANCHORAGE Y  Y CNTNR M04986  20 216.4 23.77 9.14 20668 2012 69 1582 36133   
6812211 HORIZON CHALLENGER Y  Y CNTNR M29114  21 213.65 27.43 9.75 22493 3415 137 1364 31154   
7224306 HORIZON CONSUMER Y  Y CNTNR M37721  22 219.45 28.95 9.45 25730 6751 270 1468 33529   
6905252 HORIZON CRUSADER Y  Y CNTNR M30008  21 213.65 27.43 9.75 20904 3510 140 1354 30925   
6820579 HORIZON DISCOVERY Y  Y CNTNR M29197  21 213.65 27.43 9.75 22013 3510 140 1382 31565   
7617905 HORIZON ENTERPRISE Y   CNTNR M56342  21 247.79 27.43 8.84 31477 4977 199 1863 42551   
7218462 HORIZON EXPEDITION Y  Y CNTNR M37711  22.5 203.69 27.49 11.13 19845 4411 137 1254 28641   
7233278 HORIZON HAWAII Y  Y CNTNR M37169  22.5 203.69 27.49 10.69 19842 4411 137 1254 28641   
8419166 HORIZON KODIAK Y  Y CNTNR M05765  20 216.4 23.77 9.14 20668 2012 69 1582 36133   
7116315 HORIZON NAVIGATOR Y  Y CNTNR M33359  21 247.79 27.43 11.14 31303 4439 178 1848 42208   
7617890 HORIZON PACIFIC Y   CNTNR M47910  21 247.79 27.43 8.84 31268 4977 199 1863 42551   
7366312 HORIZON PRODUCER Y  Y CNTNR M39765  22 219.45 28.95 9.45 25730 6751 270 1468 33529   
7729461 HORIZON RELIANCE Y   CNTNR M55928   21 272.17 30.48 11.58 46631 5740 230 2097 47895   
7729459 HORIZON SPIRIT Y   CNTNR M5816  21 272.17 30.48 11.58 41165 5740 230 1650 37686   
8419154 HORIZON TACOMA Y  Y CNTNR M05275  20 216.4 23.77 9.14 20668 2012 69 1582 36133   
7326233 HORIZON TRADER Y  Y CNTNR M38859  21 247.79 27.43 10.06 31657 4510 180 1848 42208   
7802718 KAUAI Y  Y CNTNR M56214  20 219.45 28.95 10.36 26350 6818 110 1626 37138   
7105471 LIHUE Y  Y CNTNR M33964  21.3 249.92 30.48 10.67 38656 1130 138 1979 45200   
8413239 LYKES DISCOVERER Y Y  CNTNR M04479  21 259.99 32.2 10.29 44966 3304 78 2698 61622   
8413277 LYKES EXPLORER Y Y  CNTNR M04131  21 259.99 32.2 10.29 44966 3304 78 2698 61622   
8415952 LYKES LIBERATOR Y Y  CNTNR M04507  21 259.99 32.2 10.29 44966 3304 78 2698 61622   
8905969 LYKES MOTIVATOR Y Y  CNTNR N51469  21.7 242.25 32.2 11.7 43714 3676 97 2500 57100   
8413289 LYKES NAVIGATOR Y Y  CNTNR M04444  21 259.01 32.2 10.29 44966 3304 78 2698 61622   
9155133 MAERSK CAROLINA Y Y  CNTNR N73744  24.2 292.07 32.25 13.5 62228 5580 223 3084 70438   
9155119 MAERSK GEORGIA Y Y  CNTNR N73742  24.2 292.09 32.25 13.5 62242 5580 223 3084 70438   
9155121 MAERSK MISSOURI Y Y  CNTNR N73743  24.2 292.07 32.5 13.5 62226 5580 223 3084 70438   
9235531 MAERSK VIRGINIA Y Y  CNTNR N95638  24.2 292.07 32.25 13.5 61150 5580 223 3084 70438   
7907996 MAHI  Y   CNTNR M60277  23.3 262.12 32.31 10.67 30825 5296 212 2824 64500   
7907984 MANOA Y   CNTNR M59887  23.3 262.12 32.31 10.67 30825 5296 212 2824 64500    
9244130 MANUKAI Y  Y CNTNR M31227  19 219.75 28.95 10.36 30000 7010 108 1726 39422   
7602338 MAUI Y  Y CNTNR M46841  20 219.45 28.95 10.36 26665 6818 110 1626 37138   
9268538 MAUNAWILI Y  Y CNTNR M92580  19 210.2 28.95 11 30000 7010 108 1726 39422   
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7908005 MOKIHANA Y   CNTNR M60972  23.3 262.12 32.31 10.67 30825 5296 212 2824 64500    
8616934 PRESIDENT ADAMS Y Y  CNTNR M07075  24 275.11 39.4 12.5 53615 3320 152 3600 82224   
8710704 PRESIDENT GRANT Y   CNTNR M07496  23.6 275.8 32.2 12.5 51437 6146 123 3000 68520   
8616300 PRESIDENT JACKSON Y Y  CNTNR M07077  24.3 275.11 38.48 12.4 53615 3320 153 3600 82224   
8616922 PRESIDENT POLK Y Y  CNTNR M06942  24.3 275.11 38.48 12.5 53615 3320 152 3600 82224   
8616283 PRESIDENT TRUMAN Y Y  CNTNR M06519  24.3 275.2 39.4 12.5 53615 3320 152 3600 82224   
8802909 PRESIDENT WILSON Y   CNTNR M08637  23.6 275.08 32.3 12.5 51437 6146 123 3000 68520   
9002037 R.J. PFEIFFER Y  Y CNTNR N52972  22.5 217.47 32.26 11.6 28555 2309 2229 2229 50910   
8212647 SEA-LAND ACHIEVER Y Y  CNTNR M63322  19.1 289.52 32.3 12.7 58943 7321 70 3606 82361   
8212685 SEA-LAND ATLANTIC Y Y  CNTNR M64273  19.1 289.55 32.31 11.58 58943 6370 74 3606 82361   
8212702 SEA-LAND COMMITMENT Y Y  CNTNR M64486  19.1 289.52 32.22 11.67 58943 7321 80 3606 82361   
7820966 SEA-LAND DEFENDER Y Y  CNTNR M54907  20.7 257.49 30.78 10.06 30379 3477 76 2306 52669   
7820904 SEA-LAND DEVELOPER Y   CNTNR M55329  20.7 257.51 30.78 10.06 30296 3477 76 2306 52669   
7820849 SEA-LAND ENDURANCE Y Y  CNTNR M56391  20.7 257.49 30.78 10.06 30224 3477 76 2306 52669   
7820930 SEA-LAND EXPLORER Y Y  CNTNR M55235  20.7 257.49 30.78 10.06 30298 3477 76 2306 52669   
7820978 SEA-LAND EXPRESS Y   CNTNR M55390  20.7 257.49 30.78 10.06 30422 3477 76 2306 52669   
8212611 SEA-LAND FLORIDA Y Y  CNTNR M62755  19.1 289.52 32.22 121.68 58943 7321 74 3606 82361   
7820942 SEA-LAND INDEPENDENCE Y   CNTNR M55811  20.7 257.85 30.78 10.06 33939 3477 76 2306 52669   
7820851 SEA-LAND INNOVATOR Y Y  CNTNR M56523  20.7 257.48 30.78 10.06 30350 3477 76 2306 52669   
8212659 SEA-LAND INTEGRITY Y Y  CNTNR M63696  19.1 289.55 32.31 11.58 58943 6370 73 3606 82361   
7820928 SEA-LAND LIBERATOR Y Y  CNTNR M54781  20.7 257.85 30.78 10.06 30416 3477 76 2306 52669   
8212623 SEA-LAND MOTIVATOR Y Y  CNTNR M62754  21 261.02 32.22 11.6 58943 7321 74 2890 66008   
7820899 SEA-LAND PATRIOT Y Y  CNTNR M54540  20.7 257.85 30.78 10.06 30234 3477 76 2306 52669   
8212726 SEA-LAND PERFORMANCE Y Y  CNTNR M64850  19.1 289.55 32.31 11.58 58869 6370 73 3606 82361   
8212661 SEA-LAND PRIDE Y Y  CNTNR M63688  21 261.02 32.22 11.6 58943 7321 75 2890 66008   
8212697 SEA-LAND QUALITY Y Y  CNTNR M64248  19.1 289.55 32.31 11.58 58869 6370 73 3606 82361   
7820916 SEA-LAND VOYAGER Y   CNTNR M55960  20.7 257.48 30.78 10.06 30390 3477 76 2306 52669   
8813025 STRONG PATRIOT/10 Y   CNTNR M10278  14 91 16.21 4.25 3100 418 10 170 3883   
                   
 TOTAL CONTAINERSHIPS    76              
                   
7504627 BUFFALO SOLDIER/7 Y   CNTRRBB M47525 143064 19 204.15 26.51 10.74 27438 3008 120 1063 24279  18988 
                   
 TOTAL CNTNR-RO/RO-BB    1              
                   
8322789 LTC CALVIN P. TITUS Y   CNTRO/RO M64759  17.8 198.6 32.21 10.99 33625 2200 65 2101 47987   
7321087 LURLINE/8 Y  Y CNTRO/RO M38565 96400 25 251.9 28.05 9.4 22030 3205 128 1379 31496   
7361233 MAERSK ALASKA Y   CNTRO/RO M43216  21 239.28 30.56 11.52 29914 88 4.25 1413 32273   
7361180 MAERSK ARIZONA Y   CNTRO/RO M42383  21 239.28 30.56 11.52 29839 88 2.25 1413 32273   
7334204 MATSONIA/8 Y  Y CNTRO/RO M38964 102500 25 213.4 32 12 13860 3270 131 1712 39102   
8320547 SP5 ERIC G. GIBSON(MSC) Y   CNTRO/RO M63556  17.8 198.86 32.2 10.99 33625 2646 69 2101 47987   
8300200 VIRGINIAN Y   CNTRO/RO M62490 80697 16.5 156.06 32.01 9.02 20375 2140 48     
                   
 TOTAL CONTAINER-RO/RO    7              
 96
                   
9213935 INDUSTRIAL CHALLENGER/7 Y   HVYLFT N92162 33119 16.5 119.8 20 7.4 8661 738 25 350 7994  7224 
                   
 TOTAL HEAVY LIFT    1              
                   
7634343 JANIS GUZZLE/MARIE FLOOD Y  Y ITB N29500 40000 15.4 164.59 25.9 9.75 34500 815 23     
7236024 BETTY WOOD/PAT CANTRELL Y  Y ITB N22884 30000 12 206.7 25.1 9.75 33600 386 26     
7532741 BARBARA KESSEL/GAYLE 
EUSTACE 
Y  Y ITB N28304 21000 12.5 191.4 22.9 8.46 33281 684 23     
7303853 SHARON DEHART/DORIS 
GUENTHER 
Y  Y ITB M49309 20000 19.2 167 23.16 8.5 23000 196 16     
                   
 TOTAL ITB    4              
                   
8227460 ATLANTIC FOREST Y Y  LASH M62023  20 262.93 32.21 11.65 47320   1148 26220   
                   
 TOTAL LASH    1              
                   
7367445 EL MORRO/8 Y  Y LOLO M40051 104822 21.5 241.03 28.05 9.18 14897 3206 128 687 15691   
7506015 EL YUNQUE/8 Y  Y LOLO M46183 104822 25 241.03 27.97 9.02 14472 3206 128 687 15691   
9129706 FREEDOM Y Y  RO-RO M69400 222802 18.8 190.05 32.26 10.2 19884 2528 46     
7420493 GREAT LAND Y  Y RO/RO M42438 205901 25 241.09 28.04 9.14 11500 3093 124     
9073701 GREEN COVE Y Y  RO/RO N61876 131998 19 178.8 32.3 9.14 13277 2763 111     
9181376 GREEN DALE Y Y  RO/RO N78110 131998 19 178.8 32.3 9.14 14930 2744 110     
8607749 GREEN LAKE Y Y  RO/RO N74472 150828 19 199.8 32.3 9.14 22799 2941 61     
9056296 GREEN POINT Y Y  RO/RO N58916 128328 18 199.8 32.3 9.7 14930 2263 44     
7518563 INDEPENDENCE(ex TELLUS) Y   RO/RO M47152 134312 19.8 194.52 32.01 9.7 18890 3653 75     
8320779 LIBERTY (ex FAUST) Y Y  RO/RO M00244 135324 19.5 199.02 32.26 11.66 28055 4228 52     
7717171 MAERSK CONSTELLATION Y   RO/RO M55474 33000 18.5 182 27.49 11.85 21213 2708 30     
9232278 MIDNIGHT SUN Y  Y RO/RO N95347 300165 24 255.72 35.96 8.99 27835 3084 123     
9232280 NORTH STAR Y  Y RO/RO M47479 300165 24 171.4 25.4 10.6 27835 3407 136     
7395351 NORTHERN LIGHTS Y  Y RO/RO M41585 205901 25 240.78 28.05 8.53 11500 3194 128     
8606056 OVERSEAS JOYCE Y Y  RO/RO M05052 100965 18.5 190.51 32.26 8.9 16141 2841 114     
8602775 PATRIOT(ex FIDELIO) Y Y  RO/RO M03816 155947 18 190.05 32.26 8.92 15436 1842 35     
9080297 RESOLVE (ex TANABATA) Y   RO/RO M62723 215709 19.4 189.8 32.26 10.19 19768 2212 48     
7614915 WESTWARD VENTURE  Y  Y RO/RO M47131 205901 25 240.99 31.99 9.14 11500 3615 145     
                   
     18              
                   
7634331 STRONG/AMERICAN Y   TUGBRG N60171 90000 15.5 211.6 25.1  7100       
                   
 TOTAL TUG/BARGE DRY    1              
       TOTAL VISA:  126         
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       TOTAL MSP:  47         
                   
       TOTAL JONES ACT:  38         
                   
1 LOA, BEAM AND DRAFT ARE EXPRESSED IN METERS,  FUEL CAPACITY IN METRIC TONS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION IN METRIC TONS PER DAY. 
                   
2 THE "Y" IN A CELL INDICATES VESSEL PARTICIPATION IN A PROGRAM.  "VSA" STANDS FOR THE VOLUNTARY INTERMODAL SEALIFT 
AGREEMENT (VISA)   
  
 PROGRAM. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE 126 VESSELS  IN THE PROGRAM.  "MSP" STANDS FOR THE MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM.  CURRENTLY, THERE ARE 
47  
 
 VESSELS IN THE PROGRAM. "JA" STANDS FOR JONES ACT AND A "Y" INDICATES VESSELS PARTICIPATING IN CONTIGUOUS AND NON-CONTIGUOUS 
DOMESTIC  
 
 TRADE.                   
                   
 AN "MSC" NEXT TO A VESSEL'S NAME STANDS FOR THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AND  INDICATES THAT THE VESSEL IS UNDER CHARTER 
TO MSC. 
  
                   
 PLEASE NOTE:  FOR VESSELS PARTICIPATING IN THE VISA PROGRAM, SQUARE FOOTAGE, TEUS AND BALE CUBIC CAPACITY REPRESENT THE VESSEL 
OWNER'S 
 
 ESTIMATE OF MILITARILY USEFUL CAPACITY.              
                   
3 IN CALCULATING THE MEASUREMENT TON CAPACITY OF TEU CONTAINERS, THE RATIOS OF 25.87 CUBIC METERS PER TEU AND 35.315 CUBIC FEET PER 
METER 
 
 WERE USED.                  
                   
4 IF A VESSEL WAS REBUILT, THE YEAR REBUILT IS SHOWN.             
                   
5 FOR THE BREAKBULK VESSELS, THE TEU CAPACITY AND BALE CUBIC CAPACITY ARE MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE. 
       
                   
6 FOR THE BULK CARRIER CYNTHIA FAGAN THE SQUARE FOOTAGE AND MEASUREMENT TON CAPACITY ARE MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE. 
    
                   
7 THE SQUARE FOOTAGE, TEU AND MEASUREMENT TON CAPACITIES ARE MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE. 
        
                   
8 THE SQUARE FOOTAGE AND TEU CAPACITY ARE ADDITIVE.           
                   
9 THE PRIDE OF ALOHA CURRENTLY HAS 1001 CABINS AND A PASSENGER CAPACITY OF 2450.  THE COMMERCIAL CREW SIZE IS 847. 
                   
10 THESE VESSELS ARE NOT "MILITARILY USEFUL" ACCORDING TO THE STRICT DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE, HOWEVER, THEY PARTICIPATE IN THE VISA  
 PROGRAM AND, THEREFORE, ARE TREATED AS AN EXCEPTION.            
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East ships Type 
capa 
TEU's 
/ sqft ship speed   comments 
                  
APL PS1   APL Japan cont 5108 24? no VISA ? on avg all 7 days 
  Pacific South 1   Pres Jackson cont 3600 24.3   
      APL Kennedy cont 4848 24? no VISA? 
Seattle - Vancouver - Los Angeles - Yokohama 
- 
Yantian - Hong Kong - Kaohsiung - Singapure 
     Pres Adams cont 3600 24.3   Los A - Singa - Los A each 19 days sail 
     Pres Polk cont 3600 24.3   2 days loading each Sing and Los A  
     Pres Truman cont 3600 24.3   total round 36 - 38 days 
         
APL   MGS SL Liberator cont 2306 20.7   on avg all 7 days 
  Mediterranean Golf Service   SL Independence cont 2306 20.7   
New York - Charlston - Miami - Houston - 
Gioia Tauro - Genoa - Algeciras 
     SL Voyager cont 2306 20.7    
     SL Mariner cont 2306 20.7? no VISA? Houston - Gioia T 15 days / Gio - Hou 18 days 
     SL Developer cont 2306 20.7   2 days loading HOU / 1 day Gioia  
                total round in 35 days 
         
Maersk TP2   SL Patriot cont 2306 20.7   on avg all 7 days one ship 
  Transpacific II   SL Explorer cont 2306 20.7   
Los Angeles - Oakland - Yokohama - Nagoya -
Busan - Xingang - Quingdao - Kwangyang 
     SL Defender cont 2306 20.7    
     SL Endurance cont 2306 20.7    Oak - Kwang  20 days / Kwang - Oak 14 days 
     SL Innovator cont 2306 20.7   Oak and Kwang each loading 1 day 
         
 Maersk   TA2 SL Integrity cont 3606 19.1   on avg all 7 days 
  Transatlantic2   SL Pride cont 2890 21   
Houston - Charlston - Norfolk -  
Rotterdam - Felixstowe - Bremerhaven 
     SL Florida cont 3606 19.1    
     SL Motivator cont 2890 21   Nor - Bre in 13 days / Bre - Nor in 22 days 
     SL Achiever cont 3606 19.1   Nor and Bre each loading 1 day 
         
A RoRo C   Atlantic Liberty sqft 135,324 19   on avg all 7 days one ship 
 RoRo Transatlantic   Patriot sqft 155,947 17   
Antwerp - Bremerhaven - Southampton 
Brunswick - Charlston - Baltimore 
     Freedom sqft 222,802 18    
               each trip 14 days 
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RO-RO cont RO-RO lash 
1 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.33 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
2 4.28 0.00 0.00 28.86 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
3 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.15 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
4 4.28 0.00 0.00 28.80 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
5 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.08 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
6 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.05 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
7 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.34 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
8 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.22 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
9 4.28 0.00 0.00 28.98 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
10 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.04 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
11 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.02 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
12 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.25 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
13 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.27 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
14 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.49 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
15 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.10 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
16 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.22 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
17 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.37 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
18 4.28 0.00 0.00 28.83 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
19 4.28 0.00 0.00 29.20 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
20 4.28 0.00 0.00 28.87 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
21 5.28 0.00 0.00 26.85 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
22 5.28 0.00 0.00 26.65 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
23 5.28 0.00 0.00 26.57 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
24 5.28 0.00 0.00 26.38 1038.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 346.00 0.00 30.00 
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APPENDIX L: EXCERPT OF PORT DETAIL OUTPUT 
            
 Gioia   if no mil mat "cont %" will display delivered material    
            





capacity Rep # time RO-RO ship capacity Rep # time lash ship capacity 
1.00 15 346.00 346.0 1.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 1.00 17 30.00 30.0 
1.00 22 692.00 346.0 2.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 2.00 16 30.00 30.0 
1.00 29 1038.00 346.0 3.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 3.00 16 30.00 30.0 
2.00 15 346.00 346.0 4.00 16 4500.00 4500.0 4.00 16 30.00 30.0 
2.00 22 692.00 346.0 5.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 5.00 16 30.00 30.0 
2.00 29 1038.00 346.0 6.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 6.00 16 30.00 30.0 
3.00 15 346.00 346.0 7.00 16 4500.00 4500.0 7.00 16 30.00 30.0 
3.00 22 692.00 346.0 8.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 8.00 16 30.00 30.0 
3.00 29 1038.00 346.0 9.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 9.00 16 30.00 30.0 
4.00 15 346.00 346.0 10.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 10.00 16 30.00 30.0 
4.00 22 692.00 346.0 11.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 11.00 16 30.00 30.0 
4.00 29 1038.00 346.0 12.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 12.00 16 30.00 30.0 
5.00 15 346.00 346.0 13.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 13.00 16 30.00 30.0 
5.00 22 692.00 346.0 14.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 14.00 16 30.00 30.0 
5.00 29 1038.00 346.0 15.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 15.00 16 30.00 30.0 
6.00 15 346.00 346.0 16.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 16.00 16 30.00 30.0 
6.00 22 692.00 346.0 17.00 16 4500.00 4500.0 17.00 16 30.00 30.0 
6.00 29 1038.00 346.0 18.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 18.00 16 30.00 30.0 
7.00 15 346.00 346.0 19.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 19.00 16 30.00 30.0 
7.00 22 692.00 346.0 20.00 15 4500.00 4500.0 20.00 16 30.00 30.0 
7.00 29 1038.00 346.0 21.00 16 4500.00 4500.0 21.00 17 30.00 30.0 
8.00 15 346.00 346.0 21.00 25 9000.00 4500.0 21.00 26 60.00 30.0 
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Atlantic global view  
              
                  
repl cont time repl roro time repl lash time 
60.00 498.00 13.09 63.00 23495.00 17.50 229.00 27.00 21.37 
60.00 844.00 14.98 63.00 43528.00 19.07 229.00 51.00 32.96 
60.00 1342.00 22.48 63.00 64485.00 24.62 229.00 73.00 38.43 
60.00 1688.00 24.33 63.00 84136.00 25.89 230.00 26.00 20.23 
60.00 2186.00 31.79 63.00 107535.00 31.27 230.00 54.00 32.34 
60.00 2532.00 33.39 63.00 128964.00 34.46 230.00 80.00 38.59 
61.00 320.00 18.94 63.00 146544.00 38.86 231.00 24.00 23.36 
61.00 754.00 20.14 64.00 19072.00 18.47 231.00 50.00 31.32 
61.00 1069.00 24.13 64.00 42242.00 20.68 232.00 20.00 21.24 
61.00 1492.00 26.35 64.00 61103.00 26.07 232.00 49.00 32.29 
61.00 1977.00 29.35 64.00 79171.00 27.56 233.00 24.00 21.09 
61.00 2276.00 33.80 64.00 99208.00 33.58 233.00 47.00 27.82 
61.00 2656.00 37.81 64.00 116480.00 34.11 234.00 22.00 21.72 
62.00 380.00 19.36 64.00 136992.00 38.71 234.00 42.00 31.64 
62.00 645.00 20.60 65.00 16684.00 16.44 235.00 25.00 25.08 
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APPENDIX N: STRATEGIC SEALIFT INVENTORY 
Strategic Sealift Inventory 
(As of 1 November 2004) 
The following list of militarily useful ships is compiled from information furnished by the MSC Program 
Managers, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and other authoritative sources. The figures are updated 
monthly 
Category Dry Tanker PAX Total 
MSC Force 64 8 0 72 
Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) 8       
Large Medium-Speed RO/RO (LMSR)(1) 19       
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) 16       
PREPO (U.S. Charters) 6       
PREPO (RRF Tendered to MSC) 1 2     
RRF (Operational) 10       
Other U.S. Charters 4 2     
USNS Tankers   4     
  
Ready Reserve Force 41 5 0 46 
Auxiliary Crane Ship (T-ACS) 10       
Breakbulk (BB) 2       
Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) 3       
Sea Barge (SEABEE) 2       
Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) 22       
Combo 0       
Aviation Support (T-AVB) 2       
  
U. S. Commercial 102 55 1 158 
Readiness Agreements (2) 94 20 0 114 
Breakbulk 5       
Container 69       
Container RO/RO 8       
RO/RO 5       
Car Carrier 7       
      
Other U.S. Commercial 8 35 1 44 
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Category Dry Tanker PAX Total 
Effective U. S. Control(3) 40 17 2 59 
VTA Tankers   6     
Non-VTA Tankers   11     
  
Other Allies(4) 48 11 0 59 
  
Overall Total 295 96 3 394 
 
Notes: 
1. All nineteen LMSRs have joined the MSC Force. Three are Preposition, nine Surge, and 
seven are operational.  
2. Includes the following:  
 Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 
(VISA) for dry cargo ships.  
 Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) for tankers.  
 Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) for both. 
3. EUSC ships are normally available only after requisitioning is authorized, except for 
those tankers enrolled in the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA). 
4. These ships are dedicated to USCINCPAC and identified by name through a bilateral 
shipping agreement. 
 
   
 
           Military Sealift Command, ATTN: Public Affairs, 914 Charles Morris Ct. SE, Washington Navy Yard, DC, 20398-5540 
           General Information: 1-888-SEALIFT • Marine Employment Opportunities: 1-877-JOBS-MSC  •  
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